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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH 
Devon D., INC., a Utah 
Corporation, 
Plaintiff, Appellant, 
vs. 
HOWARD NELSON, SHARON NELSON, 
Defendants, Appellees, 
BRIEF OF APPELLEES 
Civil No. 930406 CA 
Priority #15 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This appeal was brought pursuant to Rule 3(a) of the Utah 
Rules of Appellate Procedure. This Court has appellate 
jurisdiction of this case pursuant to title 78 part 2a, 
section 3(2)(k) of the Utah Code (1953 as amended.) 
NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a Decree and Judgment, entered by 
the Fourth District Court December 29, 1992, following a trial 
to the bench on the 20th and 21st days of April and the 18th, 
19th, and 20th days of May, 1992. 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR APPEAL 
Devon D. presents two issues on appeal: 
1. Did the court error in its findings of fact by 
including some, but not all of Devon D.'s exhibits in 
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calculating the amount of the benefit received by the Nelsons. 
2. Did the court error as a matter of law when it 
refused to grant pre-judgment interest on any additional sums, 
not granted in the judgment. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Devon D.'s first allegation of error involves a factual 
finding by the court. "Findings of fact, whether based on 
oral or documentary evidence, shall not be set aside unless 
clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the 
opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the 
witnesses" Rule 52(a) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Devon 
D.'s second allegation of error involves the application of 
law to facts. Legal conclusions are reviewed for correction 
of error. Marchant v Park City, 771 P.2d 677, 680 (Utah App 
1989) aff'd, 788 P.2d 520 (Utah 1990). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is a case involving a dispute over the amount of 
money owed by Howard and Sharon Nelson (hereafter "Nelsons") 
to Devon D., and to quiet title to land. Devon D. filed its 
complaint on or about February 23, 1989, (Rd. 5) alleging a 
debt owed by Nelsons to Devon D. based on contract. The 
complaint alleged the amount owed "totalled over $60,000.00." 
The complaint also alleged Nelsons were indebted to workers, 
materialmen, suppliers and subcontractors in the amount of 
$125,000.00. Devon D. sought payment from Nelsons of 
2 
$60,000.00 and either payment of an additional $125,000.00 to 
Devon D., or indemnity to Devon D. for contingent claims which 
may be brought against Devon D. arising out of the 
construction of the home. (Rd. 5) Nelsons answered by denying 
that the amounts claimed were owed (Rd. 41). 
Devon D. filed an amended complaint on or about January 
3, 1990, (Rd. 150). The amended complaint changed the amount 
Devon D. alleged it was owed from $60,000.00 to $56,250.76 
plus interest, and changed the amount it claimed was owed to 
others from $125,000.00 to $64,235.00. Devon D. sought 
recovery of the above sums through its amended complaint. 
Nelsons answered the amended complaint denying the amounts 
claimed were owed. In the amended complaint an issue of title 
to land was raised which issue was resolved by stipulation 
before the trial. 
Prior to trial Nelsons satisfied all other materialmen 
and labormen named. No other named defendants participated in 
the trial. During trial Nelsons acknowledged that some 
specific payments by Devon D. paid for materials and/or labor 
for the Nelson home (Tr. 213-216) 
The issues for the court to determine at trial were: 
a. Did an agreement for repayment exist between Devon 
D. and Nelson, and if so, what were the conditions of 
payment, and were the conditions met. 
b. What amount if any did the Nelsons owe to Devon D. 
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under the agreement or otherwise. 
c. Was Devon D. entitled to interest on any money owed 
to it by Nelsons. 
After trial to the bench, the court entered its 
memorandum decision dated July 15, 1992, and Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law were entered December 28, 1992, (Rd. 
464, 514). On the issues presented at trial the court ruled: 
a. No contract existed between the parties. 
b. Nelsons owed Devon D. $41,069.39 under the theory of 
quantum meruit. 
c. Devon D. was not entitled to pre-judgment interest 
on the amount owed. 
Devon D. appealed the money judgment and the denial of 
pre-judgment interest. (Rd. 521.1) Nelsons appealed, but 
later dismissed their cross-appeal (Rd. 524). On Nelsons' 
motion this court dismissed Devon D.'s appeal as to its claims 
of pre-judgment interest on the judgment as to which 
satisfactions of the judgment have been filed in the trial 
court, and ordered the appeal to proceed on appellants 
remaining claims. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Nelsons object to and dispute the statement of facts 
represented by Devon D. Its statement of facts include many 
"factual" representations which lack citations to the record 
or trial transcript as required by Rule 24(7) and 24(e) Utah 
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Rules of Appellate Procedure. Some citations to the record 
provided in Devon D.'s statement of fact contain no support 
for the representation. Nelsons provide the following factual 
statement for the benefit of the court. 
Howard Nelson arranged for the construction of his home 
by Nathan Chappell (Tr 253). Work by Nathan Chappell 
commenced ("the first contract") but stopped after a while. 
This work and stoppage occurred before Nelson was introduced 
to Gordon Griffin, a representative of Devon D. (Tr 21). A 
meeting was held where Chappell, Nelson and Griffin were 
present and an agreement was reached whereby bills for labor 
and invoices were to be paid by Devon D. Based on that 
agreement bills and invoices were to be delivered to an 
employee of Devon D. who would write out checks for Griffin's 
signature. Materials could also be purchased on Devon D. 
accounts to be paid by Devon D. (Tr 261-262). At the same 
time the Nelsons' home was being constructed, Chappell worked 
on other construction projects for Mr. Griffin's benefit (Tr 
118-121) . Mr. Griffin was aware of Nelsons' concerns 
regarding Mr. Chappell's honesty and integrity (Tr 122, 129). 
After the agreement was reached, payments were made by Devon 
D., and paid to or through Mr. Chappell upon Mr. Chappell's 
request, based solely upon Mr. Chappell's representation that 
money was owed, without invoices, receipts or bills from the 
providers of goods and services (Tr 129-130, 161-162) . After 
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completion of a majority of the construction, Devon D. 
provided Nelsons with inconsistent demands for payment (Tr 
133, 135-139, 144). Included in the demands for payment were 
many expenses incurred by Devon D. which did not relate to the 
construction of the Nelson home (Tr 151-152, 154, 158, 374, 
416, 492-497, 595). 
After trial, the court reviewed the testimony and 
evidence presented, entered its findings and awarded Devon D. 
recovery for unjust enrichment calculated upon the amount of 
some of the checks presented as exhibits at trial (Rd. 514). 
The court's findings specified the exhibits upon which it 
would grant recovery and excluded the following exhibits as a 
basis for recovery. 
Exhibit # 
P-l 
P-5 
P-9a 
P-9b 
P-ll 
P-18 
P-25 
P-27 
P-28 
P-30 
P-34 
P-36 
P-40 
P-42 
P-49 
P-50 
P-55 
P-59 
P-60 
P-61 
P-68 
P-69 
Check # 
288 
418 
441 
445 
464 
484 
502 
506 
507 
513 
527 
536 
545 
547 
561 
563 
579 
586 
588 
599 
631 
632 
Amount Claimed 
$ 
$1, 
$1, 
$ 
$1, 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$1, 
$1, 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$1, 
$ 
$ 
111.74 
,051.00 
,669.00 
404.00 
,054.00 
26.36 
293.00 
320.00 
840.00 
360.00 
,500.00 
,500.00 
40.00 
104.00 
330.00 
67.00 
26.00 
106.00 
200.00 
r075.13 
52.50 
635.00 
Trans Page 
273 
364 
367 
367 
370 
375 
377 
380 
380, 
383 
150, 
390 
392 
113, 
72, 
72, 
72, 
73, 
408 
408 
178 
183 
381 
387 
202, 
399 
399 
399 
176 
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P-72 663 $ 60.00 73, 181 
P-73 665 $ 500.00 413 
P-103 671 $ 14.85 409 
P-86 0 $ 107.82 416 
P-91 Z $ 215.82 186, 187 
P-88a 128 $ 78.00 342, 417, 418 
P-77 761 $ 111.16 186, 187, 203 
P-83 343 $ 174.50 186, 186 
P-80 1011 $ 169.50 186, 187, 206 
Total $13,196.38 
For each check on which the court denied recovery, 
evidence was presented at trial indicating the check did not 
pay for goods or services which benefited Nelsons, or left 
doubt whether the checks paid for goods or services for the 
benefit of Nelsons (Tr 150-152, 176- 178, 181, 183, 186-187, 
202-203, 206, 367, 377, 380, 408). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS 
The trial court, under an equitable theory of contract 
implied in law, calculated the benefit received by Nelsons by 
reviewing each check presented then determining whether to 
include that check in its calculation of the total amount 
expended on the Nelson home. Testimony on all of the checks 
not included weighed in favor of not including those checks in 
the amount of the judgment. Since the evidence on those 
checks was substantial, competant and admissable, the trial 
court's decision should not be disturbed. 
The trial court properly applied prior case law in 
determining no prejudgment interest should be added to the 
amount of the judgment. 
MARSHALLING OF THE EVIDENCE 
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To challenge a finding of fact, Devon D. must demonstrate 
that the finding was clearly erroneous, Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure 52(a); Crouse v. Crouse 817 P.2d 836, 838 (Utah App. 
1991). To demonstrate that a finding is clearly erroneous, 
Devon D. is required to first marshall all the evidence that 
supports the finding and then demonstrate that despite this 
evidence, the finding is so lacking in support as to be 
"against the clear weight of the evidence" Id. "If the 
appellant fails to marshall the evidence the appellate court 
assumes that the record supports the findings of the trial 
court and proceeds to a review of the accuracy of the lower 
court's conclusions of law and application of that law in the 
case" Saunders v. Sharp 806 P.2d 18, 19 (Utah 1991). 
Devon D. has failed to marshall all evidence supporting 
the court's findings of fact. Much of the evidence marshalled 
by Devon D. is presented as opinion and observation, and does 
not actually represent all evidence that supports the finding. 
In its attempt to marshall the evidence, Devon D. occasionally 
fails to include specific evidence presented at trial 
favorable to appellee. Within the marshalling of evidence 
supportive of the court's finding Devon D. tries to discredit 
or oppose the evidence presented. 
The following is Nelsons' marshalling of evidence 
supportive of the court's failure to include compensation for 
checks listed previously herein. 
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Nathan Chappell testified he was authorized to charge on 
the Devon D. account at BMC West, and he sent other people to 
charge on that same account (Tr 488) He further testified 
that BMC West, its employees or his employer would make a 
notation where the materials were shipped to (Tr. 488-489). 
When the invoices were reviewed by Devon D.'s secretary, she 
would note on the check which job to charge it to based on the 
information on the invoice (Tr. 488-489) Mr. Chappell 
testified that if somebody gave a job name different than the 
correct job name, neither Devon D. nor its secretary would 
know of the error (Tr. 489). Mr. Chappell and his employees 
worked at more construction sites than just the Nelsons (Tr. 
489-491). Mr. Chappell testified that he kept no notes and 
that charges were placed on Nelsons' home in error (Tr. 493-
4 95). Mr. Chappell testified at trial that his memory was not 
good (Tr. 430-431). Mr. Chappell also acknowledged that his 
testimony at trial was contradictory to his testimony at an 
earlier deposition (Tr. 495-496). 
Concerning Exhibit 1, Check #288 to BMC West for $300.00. 
No invoice accompanied the check to show what was purchased, 
nor how much of the total was purchased for Nelsons' home 
(Exhibit P-l). Mr. Chappell could not establish from his 
records or memory or accounting system how much, if any of the 
$300.00 was spent on materials for Nelsons' home (Tr. 498-
4 99) . No evidence to show what was purchased or how much of 
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the $300.00 was spent on materials for the Nelsons' home was 
presented other than the check itself. 
Concerning Exhibit 5, Check #418 to John Mulliner for 
$1,051.00. Mr. Chappell testified that the payment was made 
to an attorney, and that John Mulliner was an attorney for a 
roofer, or possibly a roofing supplier (Tr. 500-501). 
Chappell testified he had no way of knowing if the $1,051.00 
created a benefit to Howard Nelson (Tr. 501). No invoice, 
bill or other evidence was presented at trial showing a 
benefit to Nelson from the payment to John Mulliner. 
Concerning Exhibit 9a, Check #441 to Nila Chappell for 
$1,669.00. Chappell testified on direct examination that he 
did not know what the payments were for (Tr. 367). No 
invoice, bill or other evidence was presented to show that 
Nelsons' derived a benefit from Devon D.'s payment to Nila 
Chappell on this exhibit. 
Concerning Exhibit 9b, Check #455 to Nate Chappell for 
$404.00. Chappell testified on direct examination that the 
payment was to reimburse Chappell for labor and supplies he 
picked up (Tr. 367). On further examination he testified he 
did not know what the expenditure was for (Tr. 368). No 
invoice, bill or other evidence was presented indicating what 
labor or materials were purchased or that Nelson derived a 
benefit from the payment to Nate Chappell. 
Concerning Exhibit 11, Check #464 to AmFac Electric for 
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$1,054.48. Chappell testified he did not know if this was 
paid to AmFac for improvement to the entire subdivision or for 
improvement to the Nelsons7 home. (Tr. 507). No invoice, bill 
or other evidence was presented indicating what was purchased, 
nor that Nelsons derived any benefit from the Devon D.'s 
payment to AmFac. 
Concerning Exhibit 18, Check #484 to Superior Insulation 
for $60.00. On direct examination, Chappell testified 
insulation was purchased for the playroom over the garage (Tr. 
375-376) . On cross examination he testified that the front 
page of the insulation invoice had a notation in black ink, 
the first page showing a different invoice number. On 
the third page of an invoice bearing a different invoice 
number a notation of Nelsons home was made in red ink. He 
also testified he did not know why there were different 
invoice numbers, nor who made the Nelson notation. He also 
testified no notation was made when the insulation was picked 
up and that he did not know where in the Nelson home the 
insulation may have gone. (Tr. 510-511). 
Concerning Exhibit 25, Check #502 to Nate Chappell for 
$293.00. Chappell testified this was reimbursement for a 
building permit (Tr. 377-378) then negated his testimony. 
Chappell ultimately testified he did not know what the payment 
to him was for (Tr. 513-514). No invoice, bill or other 
evidence was presented at trial showing a benefit to Nelson 
11 
from Devon D.'s payment to Chappell. 
Concerning Exhibit 27, Check #506 to Tom Green for 
$320.00. Chappell testified on direct examination that he had 
no knowledge if Tom Green worked on Nelsons' home (Tr. 380). 
No invoice, bill or other evidence was presented at trial 
showing that this payment to Tom Green was for a benefit 
provided to Nelsons. 
Concerning Exhibit 28, Check #507 to Wayne Knight for 
$408.00. Chappell testified that Wayne Knight supplied him 
with invoices when he requested payment (Tr. 381). Devon D. 
presented no invoice, bill or other evidence indicating the 
type or amount of labor or materials supplied by Wayne Knight 
for payment by Check #507 even though it presented invoices 
indicating time, date and amount of work performed with other 
checks paid "to Mr. Knight. On direct examination, Mr. Knight 
testified that he worked on numerous jobs for Mr. Chappell and 
Devon D. during the relevant time, including curb and gutter 
work throughout the subdivision (Tr. 608), and a house in 
Woodland (Tr. 609). Mr. Knight was unable to identify what 
work he performed or on which property in exchange for payment 
by Exhibit 28 (Tr. 614). No other evidence was presented 
showing any benefit to Nelsons by Devon D.'s payment to Mr. 
Knight by Exhibit 28. 
Concerning Exhibit 34, Check #527 negotiated by Nila 
Chappell for $1,500.00. Although Mr. Chappell testified on 
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direct examination that it was payment through Nila Chappell 
for purchase of cabinets (Tr. 387) , on cross examination 
Chappell acknowledged the notation on the check indicated 
payment for "Nate's Bond", that the payee's name on the check 
had been whited out and changed, and that no invoice or bill 
for cabinets was available to identify the purpose of the 
check (Tr. 150-152). No invoice, bill or other evidence was 
presented showing that the Nelsons received any benefit by 
Devon D.'s payment of $1,500.00 to Nila Chappell. 
Concerning Exhibit 37, Check #513 to Keith Lewis for 
$360.00. Mr. Chappell testified he could produce no invoice 
showing what work Keith Lewis was paid for, or that the work 
was performed at Nelsons' home (Tr. 576) and that Keith Lewis 
worked at several jobs for Mr. Chappell (Tr. 3 84). 
Concerning Exhibit 37, Check #536 to Nathan Chappell for 
$1,500.00. Although Chappell testified it was reimbursement 
for money he spent on plumbing fittings (Tr. 3 91), he produced 
no invoices or receipts, and could not explain why the total 
was an even $1,500.00. He later admitted the amount was not 
all for plumbing and did not know why the check was not paid 
directly to the supplier (Tr. 518-519). 
Concerning Exhibit 42, Check #547 to Gordon Griffin for 
$104.00. Mr. Griffin testified he had no basis to charge that 
expense to Nelsons' home except for the notations on the check 
(Tr. 202-203). No invoice, bill or other evidence was 
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presented showing that the Nelsons received any benefit by 
Devon D.'s payment of $104.00 to Gordon Griffin. 
Concerning Exhibit 49, Check #561 to Nathan Chappell for 
$330.00. Chappell testified he requested and received the 
payment from Devon D. because he needed money (Tr. 520). He 
also testified that he had agreed with Nelsons that Nelsons 
were not obligated to pay for Chappell's work, and that the 
$330.00 was not to be charged to Nelson (Tr. 520-521). 
Concerning Exhibit 50, Check #563 to Gordon Griffin for 
$67.00. Mr. Griffin testified he did not know the reason for 
the payment and did not testify to any benefit Nelson received 
by Devon D.'s payment of $67.00 to Gordon Griffin (Tr. 154-
155) . 
Concerning Exhibit 59, Check #586 to Gordon Griffin for 
$106.00. Mr Griffin was not able to identify with any 
particularity the benefit to Nelson for which he was paying. 
Mr. Griffin testified the invoice attached to the exhibited 
indicated all work was performed at another house in another 
city (Tr. 177-178). 
Concerning Exhibit 60, Check #588 to Nathan Chappell for 
$200.00. Chappell testified that he kept no records of time 
spent on the Nelson home, that he requested payment of $200.00 
from Devon D. because he needed money to survive that week 
(Tr. 408). Chappell also testified that Nelson owed him no 
money for his work and was not responsible for payments made 
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to him (Tr. 520-521). 
Concerning Exhibit 61, Check #599 to Nathan Chappell for 
$1,075.13. Chappell testified this was reimbursement for 
labor and materials he supplied to Nelson. However, he could 
not identify the labor or the materials which were supplied 
(Tr. 408-409) . No invoice, bill or other evidence was 
presented showing that the Nelsons received any benefit by 
Devon D.'s payment of $1,075.13 to Nathan Chappell. 
Concerning Exhibit 68, Check #631 to Robert Matt for 
$52.50. Chappell testified that because of an error on his 
part, he was obligated to re-roof the Nelsons7 home. He 
supplied materials at his own expense, and labor was performed 
by all roofers at no charge to Nelsons except for the labor of 
Robert Matt. Chappell further testified he had no 
justification for Nelson to pay the costs of Robert Matt (Tr. 
525-527) . 
Concerning Exhibit 69, Check #632 to Aspen Interiors for 
$635.00. Mr. Griffin testified that Aspen Interiors belonged 
to Mr. Chappell's wife Nila Chappell. Mr. Griffin testified 
he paid this check to Aspen Interior in belief he was paying a 
debt owed to Max Brown for plumbing. He had no invoice, no 
evidence indicating the amount of labor or materials, nor did 
he present evidence that Devon D.'s payment to Aspen was paid 
to Max Brown or otherwise used for the benefit of Nelsons (Tr. 
183-185) . 
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Concerning Exhibit 72, Check #663 to Gordon Griffin for 
$60.00. Mr Griffin testified he cashed the check to pay for 
labor. Devon D. presented no invoice, bill or other evidence 
of the type or amount of labor and whether it was performed 
nor any benefit to Nelsons from this payment (Tr. 181-182) . 
Concerning Exhibit 73, Check #665 to Keith Lewis for 
$500.00. No evidence was presented to show that Nelsons owed 
payment to Keith Lewis for $500.00. Although Chappell 
testified Lewis performed some carpentry service, no contract, 
invoice, bill or other documentation or evidence was produced 
showing their payment of $500.00 related to work Lewis 
performed on Nelson's home. Chappell testified that Lewis 
worked on several jobs for Chappell, and acknowledged the 
notation on the check indicated payment on Nate's bond (Tr. 
527-528). 
Concerning Exhibit 77, Check #761 to Farmers Insurance 
for $111.16; and concerning Exhibit 80, Check #1011 for 
insurance for $169.50; and concerning Exhibit 83, Check #343 
to Farmers Insurance for $174.50; and concerning Exhibit 91, 
Check #2 to Rick Lee Insurance for $486.00; Mr. Griffin 
testified these were paid to purchase insurance on the 
Nelsons' home, naming Devon D. as beneficiary. The insurance 
did not list Nelson as a contingent beneficiary of the policy. 
Mr, Griffin testified this insurance provided no benefit to 
Nelsons (Tr. 203-204 and 187-188). 
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Concerning Exhibit 86, Check #0 to Nila Chappell for 
$107.82. Mr Chappell testified this payment was a 
reimbursement for materials and labor on the Nelson home, but 
no invoice, bill or other evidence was presented to establish 
that Nelson actually received a benefit from this payment to 
Mrs. Chappell (Tr. 416-417). 
Concerning Exhibit 103, Check #671 to BMC West for 
$119.54 which included a claim of $14.85 charged by Devon D. 
to Nelson. Mr. Chappell testified he believed the original 
accounting was in error reducing the Nelson portion from 
$97.08 to $14.85 because of confusion in billing invoices to 
the wrong job (Tr. 425-429). No evidence was provided to 
determine the accuracy of Devon D.'s claim that Nelsons owed 
the balance of $14.85 other than Chappell's memory. Mr. 
Chappell testified on cross examination that his memory was 
poor (Tr. 430-431). 
ARGUMENT I 
Evidence supports the trial court's decision not to include 
certain exhibits when calculating the value of the benefit to 
Nelsons. 
The trial court found that no express contract nor 
contract implied in fact existed between the parties. The 
court found a contract implied in law did exist between the 
parties. There is no dispute on appeal regarding the legal 
theory under which the judgment was entered. The first issue 
on appeal is Devon D.'s contention that the court 
17 
miscalculated the value of the benefit received by Nelsons. 
The only evidence presented at trial regarding the value of a 
benefit to Nelsons was evidence of payments Devon D. claimed 
to have made for labor and materials for the Nelson home. 
Devon D.'s claim of error is that the court failed to include 
in the calculation of damages all payments Devon D. claimed to 
have made. 
To permit recovery under a claim of unjust enrichment, or 
contract implied in law, the court must at a minimum receive 
competent and substantive evidence that the Nelsons received a 
benefit from the action of Devon D. (See 1A. Corbin, Corbin 
on Contracts 19, at 44, 46 (1963) and Davies v Olsen, 746 P.2d 
264 (Utah App. 1987). While Nelsons acknowledged at trial 
that some of Devon D.'s espenditures were properly charged 
against the Nelson home, other expenditures claimed by Devon 
D. were not spent on the Nelsons home, nor were they for the 
Nelson's benefit. 
Devon D.'s theory at trial, and again on appeal is flawed 
in several particulars. Under its theory, if the court 
accepts any of the checks as having been paid for the benefit 
of the Nelsons, it must accept all of the checks as being paid 
for the benefit of the Nelsons. Such an approach would negate 
Devon D.'s obligation to prove that each payment was paid on 
the Nelson House as opposed to other houses on which Devon D. 
and the contractor were working. The checks which the court 
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did not include in calculating the value of the benefit to 
Nelsons were properly excluded from that calculation. Those 
checks fall into one or more of the following categories: 
1) Expenditures from which Devon D.'s witnesses 
testified Nelsons received no benefit; 
2) Expenditures from which no evidence was presented at 
trial showing that a benefit was received by Nelsons; and, 
3) Expenditures for which there is conflicting testimony 
as to whether Nelsons received a benefit. 
The first category includes exhibits P-49, P-60, P-77, P-
80, P-83, and P-91. Exhibits P-49, and P-77 were payments to 
Nathan Chappel. Mr Chappelll testified at trial he was not 
entitled to receive those payments at Nelsons's expense. The 
remaining exhibits in this group constitute payments by Devon 
D. for the purchase of insurance naming Devon D. as 
beneficiary. Griffin testified Nelson had no interest in the 
policies. Griffin also testified Nelson received no benefit 
from the purchase of this insurance. As to this first group, 
the court properly excluded these payments in computing the 
value of a benefit to Nelsons. For the exhibits referred to 
in this paragraph, the evidence presented by Devon D.'s 
witnesses was clear that Nelsons received no benefit from 
these expenditures. 
The second category includes exhibits P-l, P-5, P-ll, P-
27, P-36, P-42, P-49 and P-59. The only evidence to support 
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a claim that payment of these check benefitted Nelson, was a 
notation on the checks themselves indicating that the drawer 
of the check thought the payment was related to the Nelson 
home, although no invoice, bill or other evidence of labor or 
materials provided to Nelsons house was presented. Proof 
that Devon D. wrote checks, is insufficient to conclude that 
the check provided a benefit to Nelsons, even if at the time 
Devon D. thought they might have applied to the Nelson home. 
For each of these checks, Devon D. could not, or did not 
present evidence to the court from which the court could 
conclude that the payments were made for the benefit of 
Nelsons. 
The third category includes exhibits P-9a, P-9b, P-18, 
P-25, P-28, P-34, P-40, P-55, P-61, P-68, P-69, P-72, P-73, P-
86, P-88a and P-103. In each of these cases, evidence was 
provided, usually by the same witness, which would support a 
finding either that the expense was made on the Nelson home, 
or that it was not. In these instances, the court was 
required to assess the witness' credibility, and the 
circumstances surrounding the payments to determine factually 
if the court was convinced the payments were used to benefit 
the Nelsons. As to these checks, the court had substantial, 
competent and admissible evidence that there was no benefit to 
the Nelsons. Factual findings are given considerable 
deference because of the trial court's ability to assess the 
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witnesses7 credibility, and will only be reversed on appeal if 
they are clearly erroneous. 
ARGUMENT II 
Although evidence may be admissable, the Court may determine 
it to be inadequate, or lacking in weight when viewed in light 
of other 
evidence presented at trial. 
Devon D.'s position at trial, and again on appeal has 
been that if evidence is admissible under an exception to the 
hearsay rule, it must be accepted by the court as conclusive, 
uncontrovertible evidence. This approach ignores the role of 
the trier of fact's in considering the weight of the evidence. 
While allowing Devon D. to present its hearsay evidence, the 
trial court openly addressed it reservations regarding the 
weight such evidence would carry. The trial court 
acknowledged the distinction between admissability and weight 
while ruling on the Nelson's objections to the admissibility 
of the checks; 
I suppose that's the question to which the Court has to 
decide, is [sic] whether or not this has any support. 
Contention is that Mr. Chappell was not reliable in this 
aspect, that there was money going form one place to 
another. I don't have any question but what the records 
were kept in the course of the business. The question 
the Court has is how reliable they may be. And that may 
be nothing more than a question of what is afforded the 
document (Tr 360). 
Nelson's argument was and still is that merely having a 
notation with the Nelson's name on a check, does not provide 
sufficient information for the court to conclude that the 
proceeds from that check actually went to the improvement of 
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the Nelson's house. Evidence at trial suggested several other 
possible uses of those funds. Mr. Griffin was constructing 
several other houses at the same time as the was paying bills 
for the Nelson house. Mr. Chapell understood he was to 
provide an invoice or bill for each check which was written to 
verify the materials or labor supplied. In some instances he 
did not supply an invoice nor a bill. In some instances Mr. 
Chappell obtained payments from Devon D. which he was not 
entitled to, but he took because "he needed the money". These 
draws would be charged to Nelsons. Mr. Chappell was building 
other homes in addition to the Nelson home during the time of 
construction. Numerous employees had access to Devon D.'s 
open accounts, and could shift liability for their purchases 
without detection. In several instances at trial, it was 
shown that checks bearing only the name Nelson, referred to a 
different Nelson for whom Chappell was making repairs, 
nevertheless, this Nelson was billed. It was within the 
purview of the trial court to weight these factors. It was 
also within the court's authority to include in its 
calculation of damages only those checks for which Devon D. 
presented an invoice, a bill or some other form of 
corroboration. Given the totality of the circumstances 
regarding the method of Devon D.'s record keeping, or lack 
thereof, it was reasonable for the trial court to not include 
all exhibits in calculating the amount of benefit to the 
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Nelsons even if the notation of "Nelson" appears on a corner 
of the check. 
ARGUMENT III 
The trial court properly denied prejudgment interest. 
This Court and the Supreme Court have recently provided 
clear requirements for the awarding of prejudgment interest in 
equity cases. In Shoreline Development v Utah County, 835 
P.2d 207 (Utah App. 1992), this court held that the 
determinative factor in awarding prejudgment interest is 
whether the damages upon which prejudgment interest is sought 
can be calculated with mathematical certainty. In Bellon v. 
Malnar, 808 P.2d 1089, 1097 (Utah 1991) the Supreme Court, 
quoting Fullmer v Blood, 546 P.2d 606, 610 (Utah 1976) stated: 
...No case has been cited to us where we have allowed 
prejudgment interest in an action such as the instant 
case, which is for equitable relief. "A suit of this 
nature... invokes consideration of the principles of 
equity which address themselves to the conscience and 
discretion of the trial court." In view of the highly 
equitable nature of this action where the court has 
discretion in determining the amount, if any, to be 
[awarded to the Plaintiff], we find no error in the 
denial of prejudgment interest. 
As in Shoreline, Bellon, and Fullmer, in the present 
case, a determination had to be made by the court, of the 
value of the benefit received by the Nelsons. Under the facts 
of this case, it would have been impossible to determine the 
amount owed with any mathematical certainty. Not only did 
Devon D. provide differing amount owed (ranging from 
$56,250.76 to $125,000) at different times before trial, but 
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at trial Devon D. began modifying the amounts it claimed were 
owed after reviewing its exhibits and acknowledging that many 
of them did not apply to Nelsons. It was also based upon the 
discretion of the court that the court decided to use the 
amounts paid by Devon D. as the basis for determining the 
benefit bestowed, instead of requiring an analysis of the 
value of the increased value to the Nelson property. Until 
such a formula for calculating the benefit was adopted, 
neither party had a basis to determine what the value of the 
benefit to the Nelsons was. 
Ultimately all money judgments are determined in specific 
monetary amounts to which an interest formula can be applied 
with certainty, however, by its very nature, this case did not 
provide either party or the court with the ability to 
determine the amount of damages with mathematical certainty 
before the application of certain equitable principles by the 
court. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the evidence provided at trial, it was proper 
for the court to exclude from its calculations of damages 
those exhibits for which it could have determined no benefit 
was provided to Nelsons. Based on recent case analysis of the 
awarding of prejudgment interest on equitable claims, was 
appropriate for the trial court to deny prejudgment interest. 
The judgment of the trial court should be affirmed. 
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Douglas R. CROUSE, Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v. 
Audrey CROUSE, Defendant and Appellee. 
No. 900499-CA. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
Sept 11,1991. 
Husband brougfa pKtirm to rro The Third District Court, Salt 
LakeCounty, Kenneth Rigtrup, J., denied the r^dtk^ and husband appealed. TheCourtof Appeals, Russon, J., 
held that (l)trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to modrfy aistody, and (2) wife was entitled to her 
attorney's fees, both at trial and on appeal. 
Affirmed and remanded. 
1. DIVORCE k312.6(7) 
134 — 
134VI Custody and Support of Children 
1341612 Appeal 
134k312.6 Review 
134k312.6(7) Questions of tact 
Utah App. 1991. 
Court of Appeals wifl not disturb trial court's findings of fact on a petition to nralifydivore 
change of custody unless they are clearly erroneous. 
DIVORCE kl84(4) 
134 — 
134IV Proceedirgs 
1341V(0) Appeal 
134kl84 Review 
134kl84(4) Presumptions. 
[See headnote text below] 
DIVORCE kl84(10) 
134 — 
1341V Proceedirgs 
134IV(0) Appeal 
134kl84 Review 
134kl84(6) Questions of Fact, Verdcts, and Findings 
134kl84(10) Findings of court or chancellor. 
OahApp. 1991. 
Party seeking to overturn trial court's findings of to on tKdtm to modify divorce d e a ^ has burden of 
marshalling evidence in support of findings arri then demonstrating that, despite s u ^ 
lacking in support as to be against clear weight of evidence and, thus, clearly erroneous. 
3. DIVORCE k312.6(3) 
134 — 
134VI Ois todyarr iSur^ of Children 
134k312 Appeal 
134k312.6 Review 
134k312.6(3) Presumptions. 
UtahApp. 1991. 
Court of Appeals would assume correctness of trial court's findings of to in denvinghus^ 
modify divorce decree as to change of custody, where husband had neither marshalled evidence in support of trial 
court's findings nor demonstrated that such findings were dearly erroneous, but merely only cited evidence that 
supported outcome he desired. 
4. DIVORCE kl84(5) 
134 — 
134IV Proceedings 
134IV(0) Appeal 
134kl84 Review 
134kl84<5) Discretion of court 
UtahApp. 1991. 
Trial court's decision concerning modification of divorce decree will not be disturbed absent abuse of 
discretion. 
5. DIVORCE k303(4) 
134 — 
134VI Custodyand Support of Children 
134k303 Modification of Order, Judgment, OT Decree as to Custody 
134k303(4) Discretion of court 
UtahApp. 1991. 
Trial court did not abuse its discretion in basing its refusal to modify divorce decree as to change of custody on 
lack of substantial change in rirormstances without reachir^ there were no 
exceptional criteria such as initial custody award premised on temporary condition, chaice between marginal 
custody arrangements, or default decree, and court did receive evidence on best interests of child. 
6. DIVORCE k303(2) 
134 — 
134VI Custody and Support of CWkten 
134k3Q3 Modification of Order, Judgment, or Decree as to Custody 
134k303(2) Grounds. 
UtahApp. 1991. 
Husband was not entitled to modify divorce 0*60^ to efito(±ar^ of aistcidy on basis that chiktaai bad 
recently spent almost equal time with each patent, te children had staited school, thtf 
impairment, and that husband had moved n ^ apartment into house; wife's generosily supported leaving primary 
physical custody with her, tact that ctakhm had started schod did nrtind^ 
inthatkwaswithmcoaemplatkjnofpar^ 
impairment was appropriate ground for change of custody. 
7. DIVORCE k223 
134 — 
134V Alimony, Allowances, and Disposition of Property 
134K220 Allowance for Counsel Fees and Expenses 
134k223 Discretion of court 
[See headnote text below] 
7. DIVORCE k227(l) 
134 — 
134V Alimony, Allowances, and Disposition of Property 
134k220 Allowance for Counsel Fees and Expenses 
134k227 Amount 
134k227(l) In general. 
UtahApp. 1991. 
Decision to award attorney fees in divorce cases and amouit of such iees are within scunddisaeto 
court. U.C.A.1953,30-3-3. 
8. DIVORCE k3121/2 
134 — 
134VI Custody arri Support of Childien 
134k3121/2 Costs. 
UtahApp. 1991. 
Trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding attorney fees to wife en husbairl's petition to modity 
divorce as to change of custody; trial court refused to modify custody, award was based on profler by wife's 
attorney as to his hourly rate, estimated number of hours worked, and travel expenses, wife only had part-time job 
and husband's financial state indicated that he was able to pay the fees. U.C.A. 1953,30-3-3. 
DIVORCE k3121/2 
134 — 
134VI Custody and Support of Children 
134k3121/2 Costs. 
UtahApp. 1991. 
Wife would be awarded her attorney fees on appeal by husband of his petition to modify divorce decree as to 
custody; trial court refused to modify oistocfy and awarded wife attcxney 
trial court's rulirgs. U.C.A. 1953, 30-3-3. 
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Kathleen McConkie (argued), Kesler & Rust, Salt Lake City, for plaintiff and appellant 
David S. Dillon (argued), Rilling & Associates, Salt Lake City, for defendant and appellee. 
Before BILLINGS, ORME and RUSSON, JJ. 
RUSSON, Judge: 
Plaintiff, Douglas R. Crouse, appeals from an oider denyirg his petitim 
change of custody. We affirm the trial court's ruling, but remard for a detemination of reasonable a t ^ ^ 
be awarded defendant on appeal. 
FACTS 
Douglas and Audrey Crouse were married December 6,1984. On March 31,1987, Mr. Crouse filed a 
complain for divorce, and on June 1,1988, the Ctouses stipulated to an uncortest^ The divorce decree 
provided for joint legpl custody of the Crouses' two children, with primary physical custody being granted to Mrs. 
Crouse. 
On June 14,1989, Mr. Crouse filed a petition to modify the divorce decree, seeking primary physical custody 
of the children on the basis of a substantial d i a r ^ m CTOimstances w 
required a change in custody. At a hearing on the petition, Mr. Crouse offered the folfowirgm support of his 
petition: (1) He has moved fiom an apartment into a house; (2) the children have recently spat almost equaltime 
with each parent; (3) the children have started school; (4) One child, B., has a speech impediment; and (5) the 
custody evaluation of Dr. Gary Taylor, D.S.W., recommended that Mr. Crouse be given primary physical custody 
of the children. 
Following the hearing, the trial court denied Mr. Crouse's petition, holding that Mr. Crouse had not presented 
sufficient evidence to show a substantial change in circumstances, and, in addition, awarded attorney fees to Mis. 
Crouse. Mr. Crouse 
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appeals, raising the following issues: (1) Was there sufficient evidence to support, the trial court's finding of no 
substar^cto^inciraimstances? (2) Did the trial courterr in denying Mr. Cteuse's petition on the basis of that 
findir^? (3) Did the trial, court abuse its discretion in awarding attorney fees to Mrs. Crouse? Mrs. Crouse seeks 
attorney fees on appeal. 
I. SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE 
[1][2][3] Appellate review of the sufficient of the evidence focuses m We 
will not disturb such findings unless diey are clearly erroneous. Hagqn v. Hagsn, 810 P.2d 478,481 (Utah 
App.1991) (dtir^ Jense v. Jense, 784 P.2d 1249,1251 (Utah App.1989)); see also Utah RCiv.P. 52(a). The 
party seeking to overturn the trial court's findings has the burden of marshaliqg the evidence in support of tte 
findings and then demonstrating that, despite such evidence, tte findings are so lacking in support as to be against 
tte clear weight of tte evidence and, theiefoie, clearly enoneous. Hagan, 810P.2dat481; see also Riche v. 
Rkte,784P.2d465,468 (Utah App.1989). "If tte appellant foils to marshal tte evidence, tte appellate court 
assumes that tte record supports die findings of die trial court and proceeds to a review of die accuracy of die 
tower court's conclusions of law and die application of diat law in die case." Saunders v. Sharp, 806 P.2d 198, 
199 (Utah 1991) (per curiam) (citations omitted). In die case at bar, Mr. Ctouse has neidier marshaled die 
evidence in support of tte trial court9 s findings nor cbmonstraled that such findings are clearly erroneous, citing 
instead only te evidence that supports die outcome he desires. Thus, we assume die correctness of die trial court's 
findings and proceed to review its conclusions of law. 
H. REFUSAL TO MODIFY 
[4] A trial court's decision concerning modification of a divorce decree will not be disturbed absent an abuse of 
discretion Hagan v. Hagsn, 810 P.2d 478,481 (Utah App.1991) (citir^ Myers v. Myers, 768 P.2d 979,984 
(Utah App. 1989)). Moreover, "[i]t is die burden of die party seeld^ 
demonstrate that tiiere has been a s u b s ^ Walton v. 
Walton, 814 P.2d 619,621 (Utah App.1991) (dtmg Hagan, 810 P.2d at 482). 
Mr. Crouse argues diat Emer v. Emer, 776 P.2d 599 (Utah 1989), requires die trial court to base its ruling 
on die best interests of die children, and, therefore, die trial court abused its discretion in basing its refusal to modify 
the oistody arrangement OT tte la± of a subs^ We disagree. 
[5] In Hogge v. Hogge, 649 P.2d 51,53 (Utah 1982), tte Utah Supreme Q)urt devdoped a tw(H» 
to obtainii^ a charge of custody. The party seeking modification must (1) establish that there has been a 
substantial change in drcumstances occurring subsequent to die divorce, and (2) after showing a substantial change, 
fiirdiershowtiiatdiecha^ofaistocfyismdK See also Becker v. Becker. 694 R2d 
608 (Utah 1984). The <xurt later qualified 
involving a noditigated custody decree, a trial court, in applying die changed drcumstances test, should receive 
evidence on changed drcumstances and diat evidence may inch^ 
tiiediM." Etarer, 776P.2dat605 (en^fcasisadded); seeajto.Mau^ianv. Maughan, 770P.2d 156,160(Utah 
App.1989). The HqggerBecker rule was tempered in Emer because "'[t]oori 
would lode a child into die custody of one parert or die otfier where there has b ^ 
of parenting ability of either parent and custody has been awarded only because of die default of one parent in 
feflir£ to oppose die complaint of die otf*r.'" Elmer, 776 P.2d at 603 (quotirg Kramer v. Kramer, 738P.2d 
624,629 (Utah 1987) (Howe, I , cemmirg)). 
We recently clarified die Emer rule, noting diat Elmer did not replace die HoggetBecker test widi a new test 
requiring the trial court to lode solely at die best 
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interests of die child. Walton, 814 P.2d at 621. As we explained m Walton,JHmer merely p e m i ^ 
incorporating evidence concemir^ die best interests of dE 
custody cases; it did not compel die trial court to take such evidence in every case. Id. at622n.2. Accordingly, 
it was not an abuse of discretion for die trial court to base its refusal to change custody on AE lack of a substantial 
change in circumstances without reachir^ the issue of the best irrterests of tte 
Moreover, the trial court's ruling is especially appropriate here because of the absence of exceptional criteria 
such as an initial custody award premised on a temporary condition, a choice between marginal custody 
arrangements, or a default decree. Maughan, 770 P.2d at 160. Nor is this a case where the refusal to change 
custody will result in "the cortimation of custody in a pared; who is indifferent to, or even destructive of, the 
child's welfare." Hmer, 776 P.2d at 604. Moreover, in the present case, although the trial court did not base its 
decision on the best interests of the children, k did receire evidence m to The trial judge heard testimony 
as to the children's best interests from not only both parents, but also from Dr. Gary Taylor, D.S.W., who 
perfoimed a custody evaluation concraiirg tte Ctouses'dbildren. Taylor testified that both parents are good 
parents, that the children love and have bonded with both parents, arid that his decism to recom 
Crouse be given primary physical custody was a judgment call. Thus, leaving the children in Mrs. Crouse's care, 
which fosters stability, does not leave ten in the hands of someone who is indifferent to or destructive of their 
welfare. 
[6] Additionally, "we reiterate that the high threshold established in Hpgge was set forth 'to protect the child 
from "ping-pong" custody awards and the accompanying instability so damaging to a child's proper development' 
" Walton, 814 P.2d at 622 (citir^ Maughan, 770 P.2datl60). Here,Mr. Q o u s e s e e k s a c h ^ o f a i s t o d y o n 
the basis that the children have recently spent alnrcst equal time with each parent; that the children have started 
sdiool; that one child, B., has a speech in^sediment; and that he has moved from an apartment into a house. 
First, the feet that Mrs. Crouse has been generous in sharing physical custody with Mr. Crouse is not a ground to 
change physical custody; if anything, it supports leaving primary physical custody with Mrs. Crouse, as it shows 
that she has lived up to Aere^nsibilitiesofaaistodMpareit Secondly,the feet that the children have started 
sdiool does not indicate a substantial change in circumstances because only dianges not contemplated by the parties 
at the time of divorce are relevant to the substantial change test Jense, 784P.2datl251. It was undoubtedly 
within the cortemplation of the Ctouses at the tinre of divorce th^ NorhasMr. 
Crouse shown that B.'s speech impediment is an appropriate grou^ As to this matter, 
Mr. Crousemerely testified that there are ikalities to aid B. with his spee± problem m Therewas 
no evidence that B.'s problem could not also be treated in Scofield. Thus, Mr. Crouse has not shown that B.'s 
speech impediment constitutes a substantial change in circumstances. (FN1) 
Lastly, to allow Mr. Ctousetoobtamprimaiyphys^ 
moved ficm an apartment to a house, would open the door for Mrs. Crouse to petition to re^nodify the custody 
arrangements if she obtained more comfortable housing arrangements than Mr. Crouse, thus promoting, not 
inhibiting "ping-pong" custody. Furthermore, we have previously held that a noncustodial parent's change in 
housing arrangements 
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from an apartment to a house is generally not sufficient to justify a m c ^ ^ See Wahoa 814 P.2d 
at 622. Therefore, the trial court clearly did not abuse its discretion in refusir^ to modify 
ffl. ATTORNEY FEES AT TRIAL 
[7] Additionally, Mr. Crouse appeals the trial court's award of attorney fees to Mrs. ^ Utah Code Ana 
Sec. 30-3-3 (1989) grants trial courts the power to award attorney fees in divorce cases, which award must be 
based on evidence of the reasonableness of the requested fees, as well as the financial need of the receiving spouse, 
anl t te ability of tte other spouse to pay. Bell v. Bell, 810 P.2d 489,493 (Utah App.1991) (citing Rasband v. 
Rasband, 752 P.2d 1331,1337 (Utah App. 1988)). Both tte decision to award attorney fees ani Ite amount of 
such fees are within tte sound discretion of the trial court M. (citiig Kerr v. Kerr, 610 P.2d 1380,1384 (Utah 
1980)). 
[8] In the case at bar, thetrial court awarded Mrs. Crouse $2,500 m attorn^ This figure was based on a 
proffer by Mrs. Crouse's attorney as to his hourly rate, estimated number of hours waked, and travel expenses. 
Mr. Crousedid not argufc the reasonableness of tte fees below, nor does he so argue here. The evidence that Mrs. 
Ctouse has (xify a part^in^ Furthermore, evidenceofMr. 
Crouse's financial state shows that he is able to pay thesefees. Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its 
discretion in awarding attorney fees to Mrs. Crouse. 
IV. ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL 
[9] Mrs. Crouse also seeks an award of attorney fees onappeal. " 'Ordinarily, when fees in a divorce have 
been awarded below to the parly who then prevails on appeal, fees will also be awarded to that party on appeal.'" 
Befl v. Bell, 810 P.2d 489,494 (Utah App.1991) (quotirg Burt v. Burt, 799 P.2d 1166,1171 (Utah App.1990)). 
In Ihe present case, Mrs. Crouse was properly awards Mr. 
Crouse offers no reason why the general rule should not be applied here, and therefore we award Mrs. Crouse 
attorney fees on appeal. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in: (l)hdding that tee had been no substantial change in 
tircumslances which would justify modificatm of tte 
reference to the children's best interests; and (2) awarding attorney fees to Mrs. Crouse. Accordingly, we affirm 
the trial court's ruling and, in addition, award Mrs. Crouse attorney fees on appeal in an an^xEltobedetennined 
by the trial court on remand. 
BILLINGS, J., a m i r s . 
ORME, J., concurs in tte result 
FN1. Moreover, even if B. 's speech impediment cannot be treated in Scofield, Ite remedy is not a petition to 
modify tte original divorce decree as to custody. If tte parties are unable to ancricabfy arrange for B. to receive 
treatment, Mr. Crouse's remedy is to file a motion for a temporary charjge of custody or a motion for a change of 
visitation privileges for tte period of time which B. needs for treatment. 
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Leon H. SAUNDERS; Robert Felton; Saunders Land Investment 
Coqxxation; White Pine Ranches; White Pine 
Enterprises; Kenneth R Norton, d/h/a 
Interstate Ratals, Inc., 
Plaintiffs and 
Appellants, 
v. 
John C. SHARP and Geraldte Y. Sharp, Defendants and 
Appellees. 
No. 88071OCA. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
Oct 14,1992. 
Purchasers brought action for specific performance against vendors, seeking conveyance of property paid for. 
Vendors courterdaimed fix foreclosure. The District Court, Salt Lake Ctourty, J. DennisFredai±, J., d m ^ 
specific perfomiaixe and grari^ Purchasers appealed. The Court of Appeals, 793 P.2d 
927, affirmed judgmer* on a x t e t t Granting purchasers' petition fir writ of certkxaii fe Supren^ C b ^ 
P.2d 198, held that appellate court foiled to analyze law applicabfe to case arri The Court of Appeals, 
Garff, J., held that (1) purchasers were entitled to release of property, notwilhstandirg their f a t e 
theproperty; (2) purchasers were not entitled to release d property whkft they had not paki for, (3)date 
purchasers tendered payment establish^ purchasers'equi^^ 
specified documents such condition precedent did not 
aflfectpurchaser' vested interest; (4) purchasers were rot ertitled to beneft^ and(5)both 
purchasers and vendors were entitled to payment of SGDC of their attorney's fees. 
Affimed in part, reversed and remanded in par*. 
1. APPEAL AND ERROR k842(2) 
30 — 
30XVI Review 
30XVI(A) Scope, Standards, and Bdent, m General 
30k838 Questions Considered 
30k842 Review Dependent en Whether Questions Are 
3Gk842(2) Findings of feet and conclusions of law. 
Utah App. 1992. 
Where trial court's "findings of feet" ore actually Conclusions of law, Court of Appeals will review than as 
such regardless of how they are captiocwrl 
2. APPEAL AND ERROR k842(8) 
30 — 
30XVI Review 
30XVI(A) Scope, Standards, and Extent, in Gereral 
30k838 Questkms (Considered 
30k842 Review Dependent on Whether Questions Are of Law or of Fact 
30kS42(8) Review where evidence consists of documents. 
[See headnote text below] 
2. CX)NIRACrSkl76(2) 
95 — 
9511 Construction and Operation 
9511(A) General Rules (>f Construction 
95kl76 Questions IOT Jury 
95kl76(2) Ambiguity in general. 
UtahApp. 1992. 
Wheflier an ambiguity exists in a contract preserts questionoflaw, v^ik^Cburt of Appeals wifl review 
independently. 
3. EVIDENCE k397(l) 
157 — 
157X1 Parol or Extrinsic Evidence Affecting Writings 
157XI(A) Contradicting, Varying, or Adding to Terms of Written Instrument 
157k397 Contracts in General 
157k397(l) In general. 
UtahApp. 1992. 
If contract is not ambiguous, Court of Appeals wiQknk only at documents flunselvesarri will r x t k ^ 
extrinsic evidence to determine parties' inert. 
4. APPEAL AND ERROR k842(8) 
30 — 
30XVI Revfcw 
30XVI(A) Scope, Standards, and Extent, in General 
30k838 Questions Considered 
3Gk842 Review Dependent on Whether Questions Are of LaworofFact 
30k842(8) Review where evidence consists of documents. 
UtahApp. 1992. 
A trial court's instruction of contract is an issue of law, both at trial and on appeal, and, thus, Court of 
Appeals will review as matter of law whether contract is ambiguous. 
5. VENDOR AND PURCHASER kl59 
400 — 
400IV Performance of Contact 
400IV(B) Conveyance 
400kl59 Eflfectofde&ukordelay. 
Utah App. 1992. 
Absent provision to the contrary, in conditional sales contacts for real property which clearly provide for 
transfer of clear tide to part of property upon payment of specified sums as set fo 
transferred even when request is made after coitract was in default 
6. SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE kl33 
358 — 
358IV P r o c e e d ^ aril Relief 
358kl33 Appeal. 
UtahApp. 1992. 
In determining whether court appropriately granted or denied specific performance of contract for sale of real 
estate, Court of Appeals will consider whether intent of parties is clear as to essential tarns of agreement, constnie 
partial release clauses mote strongly against seller, and whether, and at what point, right to release vested. 
7. VENDOR AND PURCHASER k50 
400 — 
400II Cbnstnctm and Opera 
400(50 Construing instruments together. 
UtahApp. 1992. 
Documents comprising real estate sales codract must be construed tpge te 
8. MORTGAGES k299 
266 — 
266VII Payment or Performance of Condition, Rdease, and Satisfection 
269(299 Performance of particular conditions. 
UtahApp. 1992. 
Purchasers' failure to pay taxes on property did rwt excuse vendore'duly to rrfease fe 
rote and trust deed provkfed te therewasno 
provision in real estate installment sales cortrart 
timefy tax payments. 
9. MORTGAGES k299 
266 — 
2 6 6 W Payment or Performance of Condition, Release, and Satisfectm 
266k299 Pfcrfomianceofpaitkiilara 
UtahApp. 1992. 
Vendors' obligation fo release lot from trust deed was not excused by purchasers' nonpayment of taxes, even 
though the purchasers' breaches of parties' installment cortract fra 
preceded their request for reconveyance of the lot; land had not as yet been foreclosed upon, there wasno 
reqpjiremert that purchases specifically reqpjest and idCTtify lots fcr release, and purchases had made paymat fca-
thek*. 
10. APPEAL AND ERROR k842(2) 
30 — 
30XVI Review 
30XVI(A) Scope, Standards, and Extent, in General 
30k838 Questions Considered 
30k842 Review Dependent on Whether Questions Are of LaworofFact 
30kS42(2) Findings of fact and conclusions of law. 
UtahApp. 1992. 
Whether a particular breach of contract is material is conclusion of law to be reviewed independently. 
11. CONTRACTS k211 
95 — 
950. Construction and Operation 
9511(D) Place and Tare 
95k211 Time as of the essence of the contract 
UtahApp. 1992. 
m installment contracts, courts look to four c ^ 
makes time of the essence in completing a given duty. 
12. VENDOR AND PURCHASER k86 
400 — 
400HI Modification or Rescission of Contract 
400ffl(A) By Agreement of Parties 
400k86 Abandonment of rights. 
UtahApp. 1992. 
Refusal of vendors to convey a lot and roadway constituted substantial breach of real estate installment sales 
contract so as to materially impair vendor's ability to rxrform ard to corlirue makirg 
unplatted property, justifying abandonment of contract 
13. VENDOR AND PURCHASER k86 
400 — 
400HI Modification or Rescission of Contract 
400HI(A) By Agreement of Parties 
400kS6 Abandonment of rights. 
UtahApp. 1992. 
Vendors' refusal to corrvey poperty which purchasers liad paid for constituted subslartial breach 
installment sales contract, impairing purchaser's ability to continue making installment payments on the property, 
ard justifying abandonment of the contract; thus, purchasers were not liable for i i r f ^ installment r«ymerts, but 
had no right to property for which they had not paid. 
14. VENDOR AND PURCHASER kl85 
400 — 
400IV Performance of Contract 
400IV(D) Payment of Purchase Money 
400kl85 Efiectofdeiaultordelay. 
UtahApp. 1992. 
Purchasers were not entitled to any portion of uriplatted acres under installment a ^ ^ 
property, where purchasers had foiled to make an installment payment, and on date of request for release of 
property, purchasers were in default for two years of property taxes, portion of inslallmertp^ 
yearly installment payment 
15. VENDOR AND PURCHASER k53 
400 — 
400II QxKtructmandOperatkmofQxlract 
400k53 Executory cr executed contracts. 
UtahApp. 1992. 
Date purchasers tendered payment under installment real estate sales contract established purchasers' equitable 
interest in roadway, even though recording of specified documents was condition precedent to trustee's execution of 
release; such ccofttm precedent did not aflect purchasers'vested irierest 
16. DAMAGES kll7 
115 — 
115VI Measure of Damages 
115VI(Q Breach of Contract 
115kll7 Mode of estimating damages in general. 
UtahApp. 1992. 
m awarding damages for breach of contract, court will atlemrXtoplaceroixeachingpartyinasgooda 
position as if contract had been performed. 
17. SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE kl27(l) 
358 — 
358TV Proceedings and Relkf 
358kl25 RefefAwarded 
358kl27 Attemative, Additional, or Inckiental FJquitable Relief 
358kl27(l) In general. 
UtahApp. 1992. 
When specific performance is in order, purchaser may be ertitled to an award of lost rer^ 
vendor may be entitled to interest on purchase money withheld by purchaser. 
18. VENDOR AND PURCHASER k351(8) 
400 — 
400Vn RemedEs of Purchaser 
400VII(B) Actions for Breach of Contract 
400k351 Damages 
400k351(8) Damages fir loss of bargain 
UtahApp. 1992. 
Purchasers did not suffer benefit of the bargain damages due to Mire of vendois to timely release property 
under real estate installment safes contract; purchasers' damages were too remote, conjectural and speculative, and 
purchasers failed to establish actual damages; moreover, vendors did not interfere with purchasers' possessionof 
property. 
19. APPEAL AND ERROR k842(6) 
30 — 
30XVI Review 
30XVI(A) Scope, Standards, and Extent, in General 
30k838 Questions Considered 
30k842 Review Dependent on Whether Questions Are of Law or of Fact 
30k842(6) Admissibility and reception of evidence. 
[See headnote text below] 
19. APPEAL AND ERROR k842(8) 
30 — 
30XVI Review 
30XVI(A) Scope, Standards, and Extent, in General 
30kS38 Questions Considered 
30k842 Review Dependent on Whether Questions Are of Laworof Fact 
30k842(8) Review where evidence consists of documents. 
UtahApp. 1992. 
Trial court's construction of prior opinion and its attendant deciskxi to bar a& 
questions of law which Court of Appeals would review for correctness. 
20. VENDOR AND PURCHASER k351(l) 
400 — 
400VII Remedies of Purchaser 
400VII(B) Actions fee Breach of Contract 
400k351 Damages 
400k351(l) In general. 
UtahApp. 1992. 
Purchasers were not entitled to damages fir interest paid for construction bare for improvemer^ 
expenditures for construction interest on land purchasers were entitled to was not damages, and expenditures for 
land it did not own and was not entitled to was too speculative to be recoverable. 
21. COSTS kl94.32 
102 — 
102VIII Attorney Fees 
102kl94.24 Particular Actions or Proceedings 
102kl94.32 Contracts. 
[See headnote text below] 
21. COSTS k252 
102 — 
102X On Appeal or Error 
102k252 Attorney's fees on appeal or error. 
[See headnote text bebw] 
21. SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE kl34 
358 — 
3581V Proceedings and Relfef 
358kl34 Costs. 
UtahApp. 1992. 
Provisions in written contracts providing for payment of attorney fees shouklordnariryte 
attorney fees incurred on appeal and attorney fees incurred in seeking specific performance. 
22. COSTS kl94.36 
102 — 
1G2VHI Attorney Fees 
102kl94.24 Particular Actions or Prtxeedings 
lG2kl94.36 Vendor and purchaser, sales. 
UtahApp. 1992. 
Vendors were not entitled to attorney's fees expended in seeking foreclosure for Mire of purchasers to timely 
pay taxes, even though contract provided for payment of attorney's fees; such was not a remedy that was a right 
arising out of breach or default of real estate installment sales contract 
23. COSTS kl94.36 
102 — 
1Q2VHI Attorney Fees 
102kl94.24 Particular Actions or Proceedings 
102kl94.36 Vendor and purchaser, sales. 
UtahApp. 1992. 
Vendors were entitled to attorney's fees expended in their pirreuit of purcrasers for unpaid taxes, such was a 
right arising out of real estate installment safes contract and contract provided that defaulting party pay all expenses 
of enforcement of breach or default 
24. SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE kl34 
358 — 
358IV P r o c e e d ^ and Relief 
358kl34 Costs. 
UtahApp. 1992. 
Purchasers' suit for specific performance was ri^ bt arising from vendors' breach of real estate installment sales 
contract, and, thus, vendors were entitled to attorney's fees expended for specific performance, where contract 
provided that defaulting party pay all expenses of enforcement of breach or default 
25. TRUSTS k368 
390 — 
390VII Establishm^anlEnforcenet of Trust 
390VH(Q Actions 
390k368 Injunction. 
UtahApp. 1992. 
Trial court did not abuse its discretion in entering temporary restrainiqg order to prevent a trustee's sale of 
property which was subject of installment contract for sale of real property, notwithstanding breach of contract by 
purchasers; purchasers were entitled to release of parts of the propoty notwithstandirg their breadiL 
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Robert M. Anderson, G k n D . Watkins (argued), Bryce Wycoff, Hansen & Anderson, Salt Lake City, for 
Saunders, Felton, and White Pine. 
Marie H. Anderson, Marifyrm P. Fmeshriber, Patricia L. LaTulippe, Nielsen & Senior, Salt Lake City, for 
appellees. 
John B. Andason (argued), Anderson & Holland, Salt Lake City, for appellant Norton 
Stanford B. Owen, Patrick L. Anderson, Fabian & Oendenin, Salt Lake City, for Surety. 
Before GARFF, JACKSON aril ORME, JJ. 
OPINION 
GARFF, Judge: 
This case originated as an appeal from fee trial cxjurt'snilirgmfev^ Sharp and 
GeraldineY. Sharp, wherein the court lukd that appellaris ( c o l l e t White 
Pine appealed. This court aflBrmedin part, reversed in part, and remanded the case to the district cxw^ Saunders 
v. Ship , 793 P.2d 927 (Utah App.1990). On certiorari, the Utah Supreme Court agreed that the Utah Court of 
Appeals correctly affirmed the trial court's findings on the basis that White Pine foiled to marshal the evidence. 
Saunders v. Sharp, 806 P.2d 198,199 (Utah 1991) (per curiam). However, the supreme court, in its per curiam 
opinion, concluded the court of appeals ened when ft "automatically a f f i n ^ Id. Ihe supreme 
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court thereupon remanded the case to the court of appeals to specifically review the district court's interpretation of 
the contract and its conclusions of law. M. at200. 
FACTS 
We reiterate the iactual statement cortained m the opinkm of tofc 
court's findings. Saurriers, 793 P.2d 927,928-30 (Utah App.1990). On November 9,1980, White Pine, together 
with others not parties to this action, agreed to purchase 60.078 acres of unimproved real property (Property) in 
White Pine Canyon, Snyderville, Summit County, Utah from Sharps for the purpose of developing twelve to 
fifteen four- to five-acre residential lots. 
At the closing of the sale on July 16,1981, the parties executed a "Memorandum of dosing Temis" (Closing 
Memorandum), a Trust Deed Note of $963,055.30, a Trust Deed, arri ^ 
Contract). Sharps' counsel prepared these documents. Appellants Leon H. Saunders, Robert Klton and Kenneth 
R. Norton executed toe Contract for the htyers, and Shar^ executed it for ttiesellas. 
White P t e agreed to pay Sharps $1,583,055.30 for the Property, $620,(X».(X) of whk^ was paid as a dow^ 
payment at closing. Pursuant to the Trust Deed Note, White Pine agreed to pay Sharps toe remaining $963,055.30 
in five annual installments, in which the principal amount of each installment would be $192,611.06, in addition to 
accrued interest on toe entire unpaid balance. At closing, Sharps conveyed fee title to the property to White Pine 
subject to the Trust Deed securing payment of the Trust Deed Note. The Trust Deed, by its terms, transferred title 
to toe trustee, Associated Title, pending completion of the obligations of toe Contract 
The Closing Memorandum noted 
1 . . . . after recordation ofthe PUD (FN1) Plat ar^ 
Restrictions, and upon i ^ 
payment money), Sella- shall execute and deliver to Buyer a Partial Deed of Reconveyance for one (1) PUD 
lot 
2. Upon toe payment of the release prioe, Buyer shall be entitled to toe release of one (1) lot of Buyer's 
choice upon receipt of toe payment or at any time thereafter. 
3. ft is agreed that at toe time of execution of this Memorandum, Buyer has paid to Sella* toe sum of 
$620,000.00 which will release from toe Deed erf Trust three (3) PUD lots. l ^ t o s r e c o d a t m o f t t e P U D 
Plat and Declaration of Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions with the Summit County Recorder, Buyer shall 
be entitled to toe release from the Deed of Trust of three (3) PUD lots of Buyer's choice together with toe said 
roadway. 
The Closing Memorandum provided that k "rmy not be oralfy changed, m o d ^ 
writing, by the party against whom toe same is sought to be enforced." In addition, toe Trust Deed Note and toe 
Trust Deed provided that- White Pine would "pay at feast 10 days before delinquent all taxes and assessment 
aflfecting said properly." These documents also cortained provisions relating to the payment of attorney fees under 
specified conditions. 
QnJune30,1982, White Pine paid Sharps an installn^ 
letter from Feteon, who was also counsel for While Pine, stating, "Upon final plat approval, we will notify you to 
obtain toe releases for toe lots and the road as per toe contract" 
The foltowir^ year, on June 28 and Jure 30,1983, White Pine paid Sharps $178,165.23. Tteremainir^ 
portion of the June 30,1983 installment payment was p ^ 
resulting in a default 
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On July 19,1983, while the June 30,1983 payment was still in default and prior to the recordation of a final 
plat, Felton wrote a letter to Jon C. Heaton, attorney for Sharps, in which Felton requested that Sharps release Lots 
1 through 5 and the Roadway. 
On September 23,1983, a Notice of Defeult was filed pursuant to the Trust Deed on the Property for tte 
default of the June 30,1983paymenL WhiteRnecui^thede6dtonNovemba ,14,1983 by tendering 
$118,397.39 to Sharps. 
On November 18,1983, Heaton sent a letter to his clients (Sharps) enclosirg for their appro\^ a proposed 
finalplaL This plat, along with a Declaration of Protective Cbvenarts (Ctovenarts), was lafe 
County. While Heaton's letter said nothing about an easemert, fc instnicted Mr. Sharp to 
enclosed consent document only acknowledges your approval of [Mr. Saundeis's] recording the plat and the 
[Covenants], copy here enclosed." Heaton's letter also noted 
By Hy Saunders' signature, which I will obtain to this letter prior to rekasir^ your consert to 
of the subdivision plat, he agrees that you cortime to have your right of approval with regflrd to how the 
southern portion of the property is platted. 
Heatm placed a signature block at the b o t ^ By." 
However, Mr. Saunders never signed the letter, nor was it signed by any other appellant who signed the Trust 
Deed, the Trust Deed Note, and the Closing Memorandum. Heaton's letter noted that Mr. Saunders intended to 
seek a "release of Lots 1 through 5 of the platted subdivision along with the road." Heaton said he had "reviewed 
the payments under the Note" and found that Mr. Saunders "is entitled to those releases." Finally, Heaton stated 
that once the releases weae made, "pursuant to your instruction we will insure that rights are reserved in [the 
Roadway] fix access for the southern portions erf the property purchased from you until your Deed of Trust is fully 
paid." 
The proposed final plat enclosed with Heaton's letter platted only the northern portion of the Property into six 
PUD lots, leaving the southern portion (approximately tweity^ven a ^ 
Cto November 21,1983, Felton, in a letter to Heaton, rejected the idea of aeating an easement in favor of 
Sharps along the Roadway and objected to the scope of the access rights proposed in Heaton's letter. 
On or about November 23,1983, Sharps executed a Consent to Record with respect to White Pine's plat 
describing Phase I of the project, \^iidi irwolved the n a A six lots arii te Roadway. The plat and fee Covenants, 
along with theConsent to Record, were recorded with the Summit C b ^ The 
plat indicated that the internal Roadway was to be private, in contravention to Sharps' intent to have the Roadway 
dedicated to public use. The Covenants provided that easements over the lots and common area properties "are 
hereby reserved by Declarant [White Pine], together with te right tog 
The remainir^ property abutting the Roadway to the south was not platted. The plat showed the existence and 
location of utility easements, including those for water lines, a waler tank and water system, substantial portions of 
whkft were to be constructed on the u r p ^ White Pine advised Sharps it would plat the balanceofthe 
Property at a lata: time. 
On November 23,1983, Sharps authorized the recofldirig of a Cancellation of Notice of Default relating to the 
June 30,1983 payment 
On January 18,1984, Sharps directed the trustee, Associated Tide, to reconvey Lots 1 through 5, but not the 
Roadway, ftomthe Trust Deed to White Pine. Sharps instructed that "(ejxeept for |Lots 1 throu^ ^ afl other 
portions of the property remain subject to the Trust Deed." 
Associated Tide did not prepare the reconveyance of Lots l t ^ ^ The 
reconveyance was recorded March 26,1986, more ton two years 
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after While Pine had tendered the funds for those lots. No explanation of the deky in prcparirg 
was provided at trial. 
On November 30,1984, property taxes of approximately $4,725.00 for Lot 6 and the unplatted property 
became due and payable. White Pine had paid only $1,515.24 of that sum. White Pine later became delinquent 
ontaxesfor 1985,1986 and 1987. The Contract provided that White Pine pay such taxes at least ten days before 
delinquency. 
White Prepaid the 1984 instalhiKrt payment of $192,611.06. The foflowirg year, onJune27,1985, Sharps 
received only a portion of the June 30,1985 installment payment m t e f ^ 
$59,709.47. 
On September 16,1985, Sharps ag3inrecorded a Notice of Default and published Notices of Sale covering 
Lots 1 through 5, Lot 6, and the Roadway and all of the unplatted property. Sharps later admitted that they 
mistakenly included Lots 1 through 5 m the Notice of Default 
In a letter dated February 27,1986, White Pine requested a release of 7.35 acres of fee unplatted acreage. 
On May 7,1986, Fdton sent a letter to Sharps noting that the buyers ^vere in a position to prepare and obtain 
approval of that plat [for the unplatted acreage] immediately.M 
The next month, White Pine defeuSed on the final June 30,1986 installmat. 
During these years, Sharps did not interfere with White Pine's attempts to market or sell the Property. 
On September 4,1986, the day before the scheduled Trustee's Sale, White Pine sued, claiming Sharps 
materially breached the Contact in that they never reconveyed the Roadway, Lot 6 or 7.35 acres of the unplatted 
property. White Pine sodght specific perfomiance of the Contract irr 
7.35 acresofthe unplatted property, as well as damages arisirg flam Sharps'breach ^ WhitePine 
also claimed Sharps' M i r e to reconvey excused White Pine's obligfltionto make fiirther iretallmer* payments, and 
tolled the accrual of interest on the unpaid principal balance. 
White Pine also obtained a temporary restraining order (TRO) restraining Sharps from conduct^ the Trustee's 
Sale. Tte TRO required a bond of $2,400.00. In a hearir^ held January 4,1988, this court ordered that the bond 
be increased to $50,000.00 "to protect the Sharps for the payment of such costs and damages as may be inclined 
or suffered if the Sharps are found to have been wrongfully enjoined or restrained." 
Sharps defended, daiming they weie exoised fixm reconveyi^ 
request reconveyances, or alternatively, because the Consert to R ^ Sharps 
thenrourterclaim^ Sharps sought a dissolution of the TRO 
and claimed damages for its wrongful issuance. 
The district court rejected White Pine's claims rulirg to 
failing to pay property taxes for Lot 6 and the unplatted acreage on November 30,1984. The court concluded that 
White Pine farther breached the Contract by failing to ^ Because these 
breaches were "material, significant and continuing and were uncured when [White Pine's] releases were first 
requested," Sharps were excused ftom reconveying Lot 6, the Roadway and the 7.35 acres. The court found that 
any damages claimed by White Pine "are too remote, conjectural and speculative." 
The court found that Sharps had substantially complied with all of their obligations undo: the Contract and were 
entitled to foreclose and sell Lot 6 and all of the unplatted property because of White Pine's Mure to request and 
identify lots for reconveyance. The court based this conclusion on White Pine's actual practice, as well as a 
requirement of the Closing Memorandum, to "make specific requests for the release of specific PUD lots ftom the 
Sharps." 
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The court also concluded, in the alternative, that (1) Sharps' execution of the Consent to Record constituted 
substantial performance of aryobligstm to release the Roadway u (2)Shaips' 
refusal to reconvey Lot 6, the Roadway, and the unplatted acreage was done in gpod feitti because they relied on 
the advice of their attorney, Heaton; (3) While Pine suffered no damages as a result of Sharps' failure to act; and 
(4) based on Heaton's letter, White Pine had granted an easement to Sharps over the Roadway for access to the 
unplatted property by the "mutual intent and agreement of the parties." The court concluded that "[a]ccess to the 
unreleased and unpaid for land was intended to be given to the [Sharps] in case of default" 
The court found that except for $1,515.2* in property taxes pakl on te urplattBd aaeage in 1984, "notaxes 
have been paid on die unreleased Subject Property subsequer* to November 30,1984 and including 1985,1986 
and 1987." 
The court entered judgment agflinst While Pine for $742,984.67 and ordered the property sold at a sheriffs 
sale. 
White Pine timely appealed. This court affirmedin part, reversed m part, and remanded fec^ to 
court Saunders, 793 P.2d at 934. On certiorari, the Utah Supreme Ctourt remanded the case bade to this court to 
review flie district court's interpretation of the Cbrtr^ Saunders, 806 P.2d at 199-200. 
ISSUES 
The questions of law before this court are (1) whether the Gxttact fc (2) the extent of White 
Kne's liabilily for taxes, and \^iedia- such liability afifects Sharps' oblig^tioii to lelease propaly; (3) whether the 
Cortract requires Sharps to recoovey Lot 6; (4) whether White Pine is excused ftom makk^ installmal and 
interest payments on tte unplatted property; (5) whether the Contract requires Sharps to reconvey 7.35 acres of the 
unplatted property; (6) whether the Cortract requires Sharps to reconvey the Roadway; (7) whether White Pine is 
entitled to benefit of the bargsin damages; (8) whether the court c o n ^ ^ 
interest; (9) ^iietha" eitha" party is otided to attomey fees incuned at trial and on ^peal; and (10) whether the 
court acted within its discretion in issuing the TRO. 
[1] This court has already affirmed the trial court's findings of feet Saunders v. Sharp, 793 P.2d 927,931 
(Utah App. 1990). The Utah Supreme Court, on certiorari has requested to this 
interpretation of the Contract aril itscorriusiansoflaw. Saunders v. Sharp, 806 P.2d 198,199-200 (Utah 1991) 
(percuriam). While we reaffirm the trial court's findings of feet, we note that wiiere the trial court's "findir^" are 
actualfy conclusions of law, we review them as such regsrdkss of how they are captioned. See 50 W. Roadway 
Assoc, v. Redevelopment Ageay, 784 P.2d 1162,1171 (Utah 1989). 
We first review the law regflrding ambiguity. We thai examine the law regsrding partial release dausesand 
apply it to the court's legfll conclusions. The application of these areas of law and the inttaprelation of the Cortract 
involve conclusions of law, which we review independently. Saunders, 806 P.2d at 199-200. 
I. AMBIGUITY 
[2] Language in a cortract is ambiguous "if die words used to express die intent of the parties are insufficient 
so to tiiecortractmay be understood to reach two or more plausible meanings." Larson v. Overland Thrift & 
Loan, 818 P.2d 1316,1319 (Utah App.1991), cert denied 832 P.2d 476 (Utah 1992). Whether an ambiguity 
exists preserts a question of law, which we review irxlependertly. Id. However, the "language of a cortract is not 
necessarily ambiguous merely because a party urges a different meaning to is more in accordance with its own 
interests." Id. 
[3] [4] If a cortract is not ambiguous, we look only at the documents themselves and do not lode at extrinsic 
evidence to determine the parties' intent. Wineearv. 
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Froerer Corp.. 813 P.2d 104.108 (Utah 1991). A trial court's construction of a cortract is an issue oflaw, both at 
trial and on appeal. Kimball v. Campbell, 699 P.2d 714,716 (Utah 1985). Thus, we review as a matter of law 
whether the Cortract is ambiguous and whether it required reconveyance of the various parcels of the Property. 
Caldwell v. Ford, Bacon& Davis Utah, Inc., 777 P.2d 483,486 (Utah 1989). 
H. PARTIAL RECONVEYANCE 
[5\ Generally, specific performance "may be granted only if the parties' intent as to die essential terms of the 
agreement is clear." Barnard v. Barnard, 700 P.2d 1113,1114 (Utah 1985). Where the agreement provides for 
partial release of a mortg3ge or trust deed on specific lots or parcels, "it has generally been held to the release 
provisions should be interpreted more s tror^ against the party required to g i ^ Sears v. Riemersma, 
655 P.2d 1105,1107 & n 1 (Utah 1982). Moreover, absent a provision to the contrary, in conditional sales 
contracts for real property which clearly provide for transfer of clear title to part of the property upon payment of 
specified sums as set forth in the c»rtract, titfe must be tran 
wasindefeuk. Bunougis v. Gamer, 43 Md.App. 302,405 A.2d 301, 30849(1979); Leisure Campground & 
Countty dub Dd. P&rtnersh?) v. Leisure Estates, 280 Md. 220, 372 A.2d595, 598-99(1977); Columbia Dev., 
Inc. v. Watchie, 252 Or. 81,448 P.2d 360, 361-63 (1968). That is, the payment of each inslallmat vests tte 
buyer wifo an interest m f e parcel an^ This duty cannot be 
retroactively excused, evmwteetebityersubseqioitfydefedts; "... it has no bearing upon the mortgagors' 
right to request a release fe whkii foil payment was made prior to default" Burroughs, 405 A.2d at 30809; 
Leisure, 372 A.2d at 598-99; Watchie, 448 P.2d at 361-63. This is true even where the buyer has not yet platted 
or described the lard, Burroughs, 405 A.2d at 308O9, and where buyer has defkilted on his or her o^ 
pay taxes on tte land. Watchie, 448 P.2d at 361-63. (FN2) 
[6] To sum up, in ctetermining whelher a court appropriately granted or denied specific performance, we 
consider whether the intent of the parties is clear as to the essential terms of the agreement; we construe partial 
release clauses more strongly agsinst the seller, and, we consider whether, and at what point, the right to the 
release vested. 
ffl. FAILURE TO PAY TAXES 
\7] That having been said, we next consider whether White Pine's Mure to pay taxes on November 30,1984 
and thereafter excused Sharps' duty to release. We acknowledge that the documents ccmprisir^theGatractmua 
be construed together in light of theirpuipose. Adas Corp. v. Oovis Nat'l Bank, 737 P.2d 225,229 (Utah 1987); 
Big Cottonwood Tanner Ditch Co. v. Salt Lake City, 740P.2d 1357,1359 (UtahApp.), cert denied 765 P.2d 
1277 (Utah 1987). 
[8] Neither party disputes that White Pine was obliged to pay taxes on the property. Nor do they dispute that 
as of November 30,1984, White Pine failed to comply with that obligation. However, Shaips claim, and the trial 
court concurred, that payment of taxes constituted a condition 
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precedent to release of the land. On the other hand, White Pine claims this conclusion was kgsl error because tte 
Contract did not specify that paymeloftaxeswasacx^nditionprecedert. 
Here, the Trust Deed Note and the Trust Deed provide that White Pine would "pay at least 10 days before 
delinquency all taxes and assessment affecting said property." Even when we consider this language along with 
the three paragraphs in the Memorandum regarding Sharps' release obligations, we see nothing conditioning 
Sharps' duty to release upon White Pine's nrakirg timefy tax payments. Because this language is unambiguous, we 
consider only die documents themselves and do not look at extrinsic evidence to determine die parties' intent 
Wk*g3r,813P.2datl08. 
Sharps cite cases where courts have held that payment of taxes was a condition precedent to release. 
Maikowitz v. Republic Nat'l Bank, 651 F.2d 825, 827 (2ni Cir.1981); City Bank Farmers Trust Co. v. 
Heckmarm, 164 Misc. 234,297 N.Y.S. 592,554-95 (N.Y.Sup.1937); dason's Point Land Co. v. Schwartz, 262 
N.Y.S. 756, 759-60 (N.Y.App.Div. 1933). These cases are inapposite either because the underlying contract had a 
proxdsionaaEleratir^te Schwartz; 262 
N.Y.S. at 758, or because the "terms of the mortgage precluded [the buyer] from demanding the release of liens so 
long as [the buyer] was in defeuk under the mcjrtgsge." Markowitz, 651 F.2d at 827. 
The issue hoe is whether the language of the Contract specifies that payment of taxes is "requisite to amble the 
other party to carry out his part of the agreement" so as to excuse Sharps'duty to release. Buckman v. Hill 
Military Academy, 190 Or. 194,223 P.2d 172,175 (1950) (where buyer had made principle payment, seller 
required to release parcel). 
Thus, while White Hne is nevertheless liable for taxes, (FN3) that liability in no way undercuts Sharps' 
oblig9tion to release property which has been timely paki for p 
I V . L 0 T 6 
White Pine claims the court erred in condudiqg that Sharps' duty to release Lot 6 was excused by White 
Pine's nonpayment of taxes. 
[9] The court concluded that because White Pine's "material and continuing breaches of the parties' Contract 
preceded timely plaintifls' requests for reconveyance of Lot 6 ... [Sharps] were not obligsted to reconvey Lot 6." 
The breach referred to by the court was White Pine's Mire to pay taxes on November 30,1984. The court 
concluded that While Pine's duty to specifically request and identify lots for release was a condition precedent to 
Sharps' duty to release, and that the Closing Memorandum and While Pine's "actual practice" established this duty. 
White Pine argues that as of November 30,1984, the date of its feilure to pay the taxes, Sharps had already 
breached by failing to timely reconvey Lots 1 through 5, the Roadway, and Lot 6. White Pine claims the court 
erred in concluding that Sharps' duty to convey would not arise until such t ^ 
requested it, and that a correct interpretation would fix the date of the duty to convey Lot 6 upon payment of the 
installment, in this case, Jime 30,1984. This date arose well before White Pine's November 30,1984 feilure to 
pay taxes. Therefore, While Pine claims ^ 
from paying future installments undo- the Contract until such time as Sharps reconveyed. 
The case of Burroughs v. Gamer, 43 Md.App. 302,405 A.2d 301 (1979) is on point Burroughs involved a 
similar release clause where die buyers requested release afler they had defaulted on the contract, but before the 
land had been foreclosed. 
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Unlike the immediate issue, which involves Mire to pay property taxes, the buyer in Burroughs foiled to pay 
principal, interest and taxes. Id. 405 A.2d at 305. After the default, buyers requested release of property for 
which they had already tendered payment. Id. at 305-06. The sellers refused to releaseon the basis that buyers 
had failed to plat the parcel and to request it prior to default Id. at 307. The Burroughs court held that because 
no provision in the deed disallowed release subsequent to default, and because release was "contemplated to take 
place in the fijture[,]" buyers ert i t to Id. at308. 
The Burroughs court relied on Leisure Can^ground & Country Qub Lid. Partnership v. Leisure Estates, 280 
Md. 220, 372 A.2d 595 (1977). The court in Lrisge held t h a t ^ ^ 
any way negates the fk i to where M pay^ 
equitable ownership of the property, and the mortgagee has, at most, only bare legal tide to it" Id. 372 A.2d at 
598. In Leisure, the court also held that, so long as the contract specified that the buyer was to select the property 
to be reconveyed, failure to describe the property prior to foreclosure would not prevent enforcement of the release 
provision: 
But, when the lender agrees that whatever the borrower may choose or intend be released will be released, he 
also agrees that the lender's intention as to the particular part to be released wifl be considered fe 
of the borrower and he should not be heard to say otherwise. The tract chosen under ttiose circumstances by 
the borrower js the tract intended. 
Id. at 602-03 (quotirg Lambert v. Jones, 540 S.W.2d 256,259 (TenaCt.App.1976)). 
In the present case, the trial court concluded that te trans of the Ctortn^ and WhteHne 
requirement that White Pine must "spec i f i c request and i d ^ This conclusion is neither 
supported by the language of the Contract, nor by case law. The only language in the Contract going to White 
Pine's duty to request andidentify a parcel prior to release is the following: "Upon the payment of the release 
price, Buyer shall be entitled to the release of one (1) lot of Buyer's choice upon receipt of the payment or at any 
time thereafter." 
In January 1984, Sharps instructed Associated Title to reconvey Lots 1 fa InJune 
1984, White Pine paid its anmal installment of $192,611.06, more than erough to pay for Lot 6 ($140,000.00). 
Obviously, under the terms of the agreement, White Pine was entitled to release of Lot 6 when it made the 1984 
payment, even though it had not requested it because this was the onfy platted lot ro 
The trial court's irierpretation misses the "crucial distinction between a vested entitlement to a release ... and 
mere conditions placed upon the fomial execution of the release b y t e Burroughs, 405 A.2d at 309. 
Moreover, the Closing Memorandum specifies that White Pine is entitled to release of the property upon Sharps' 
receipt of the payment "or at any time thereafter." This language disallows an interpretation that a release 
requested after default would be dishonored. 
We affirm the court's findings relating to White Pine's oblig3tion to pay property taxes on Lots 1 to 6 and the 
Roadway. However, we reverse theccurt's conclusionr^rdirg Sharp'sdiiy to release Lot 6. 
V. EXCUSE OF FUTURE INSTALLMENTS 
White Pine claims the court erred in holding it lial^ for unpaid installmals. White Pine claims Sharps'Mure 
to timely convey Lot 6 and the Roadway excused its withholding of those sums. 
"Parties to a contract are obliged to proceed in good faith and to cooperate in the performance of the contract in 
accordance with its expressed intent" Cahoon v. Cahoon, 641 P.2d 140,144 (Utah 1982). Thus, a "party cannot 
by wflM act or omission make it impossible or difficult for the other to perfomi and then invoke the other' s 
nonperfomiance as a defense." Id. 
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On the other hand, when ore such that it "materially impairs the 
contractor's ability to perform, [the other party] has the right to consider the contract at an end, to cease work, and 
to recover tte value of the wodc already performed." WagstaflF v. Renrco, Inc., 540 P.2d 931,933 (Utah 1975). 
In like manner, "a party committing a substantial breach of a contract cannot mairtam an a ^ 
other contract^ party ... for a subsequent failure to perfoim if the p Rogers v. Relyea, 
184 Mont 1, 601 P.2d 37,41 (1979). 
Cburts have applied the obligstm See, e.g.. DarrellJ. 
Dkiericksen & Sons, Inc. v. Magna Water and Sewer Improvement EtisL, 613 P.2d 1116,1119 (Utah 1980); 
Wagstaflf, 540 P.2d at 933. In Wagstaflf, the court acknowledged that "a mere delay of a month by one party in 
making a payment on a contract would usually result in damages only, but would not justify the other party in 
abandoning the contract" 540 P.2d at 933. The court noted that this general rule varied depending on the 
circumstances. Id. The court concluded that "where the failure to pay an installment as provkied m 
contract is such a substantial breach that it materially impaire the con^ 
consider the contact at an aid, to cease work, and to recover the value of the woric aheady performed." W. 
Not everyminor Mire justifies nonperformarre and res^ "ft must be something so 
substantial that it could be reasonably deemed to \indicatetheolha^srefiisaltopeifomL" Zion's Properties, Inc. 
v. Holt, 538 P.2d 1319,1321 (Utah 1975). 
The Utah Supreme Court applied this principle to an installment contract wherein one party agreed to pay a 
plumber as work progressed. McCanen v. Menill, 15 Utah 2d 179, 389 P.2d 732,733 (1964). InMoCanen, 
the court, noting that die defendant refused to make timely payments as established by the contract, held that "die 
plaintiff was justified in refusing to complete it." Id. 
[10] [11] Whether a particular breach is material is a conclusion of law to be reviewed independently. 
Dkiericksen, 613 P.2d at 1119; McCanen, 389 P.2d at 733. More particularly, in inslalln^nt contracts, courts 
look to the four comers of the contract to determine whether "the contract by its tarns makes time of die essence" 
in completing a given duty. Dkiericksen, 613 P.2d at 1119; McCanen, 389 P.2d at 733. 
[12] The essential question, as applied to this case, is whether Sharps' refusal to convey Lot 6 and the 
Roadway constituted a substantial breach of the Contract so as to materially impair White Pine's ability to perform 
and thus to justify White Pine's a b a n c k m ^ 
rendered "it diflScuk or impossible for [White Pine] to continue performance and then [attempted to] take advantage 
of the noivperfomiance he has caused." Zkxi's Properties, 538 P.2d at 1321. 
Hoe, the purchase and conweyarre tf White Pine had paid for the 
Roadway and Lot 6 by the end of June 1984. Sharps contend White Pine was in cfefeult when it foiled to pay 
taxes in November 1984. However, Sharps had a duty to convey the Roadway and Lot 6 in June. Thus, their 
refusal to convey constituted a substantial breach of the Contract, impairing White Pine's ability to continue making 
installment payments on the urplatted property, thus justify^ 
[13] We hold that the court ened in holding White Pteliabk for unpaid ins^ 
property. Likewise, we hold that White Pine has no right to property for which ft has not pai i 
liability to pay taxes on such property, as we forthff discuss in the next sectioa (FN4) 
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VI. UNPLATTED 7.35 ACRES 
[14] White Pine challenges the trial court's conclusion that it was not entitled to release of 7.35 acres of 
unplatted property. While White Pine's brief is not explicit, its claim seems to be that Sharps'duty to release 5.35 
acres arose when it paid the June 30,1984 installment because the p r i r i ^ portion of fliispaymal exceeded the 
amount needed to release Lot 6. White Pine claims it then became equi^fy otitled to two more aaes when it 
paid $59,709.47 as part ofthe Jure 30,1985 installment Six morths earlier, White Pine had foiled to pay taxes 
on the unplatted property, which taxes became due November 30,1984. 
The Closing Memorandum provides that "after lmHdation of te 
Conditions and Restrictions, and upon receipt of each $140,000.00 in prindpal... Sella- shall execute and deliver to 
Buyer a Partial Deed of Reconveyance for one (1) PUD lot" The next paragraph provides that "[ujponthe 
payment of the release price, Buyer shall be entitled to the release of one (1) lot of Buyer's choice upon receipt of 
the payment or at any time thereafter." 
The court's findir^s, which we have already affim^, Saundra ^ 
App.1990), reveal that White Pine paid only $59,709.47 of tte 1985 installment; it did not pay any of the final 
1986 installment; and, White Pine did not request the 7.35 acre parcel urtf February 27,1986, "de^ite the 
provision in [the Closing Menwrandum] for the release by the Sharps of 'PUD lots' only." The court found that 
as of the date of the request, White Pine was still in default far the 1984 and 1985 property taxes and a portion of 
the 1985 installment and tte full 1986 installment 
The court made no finding as to what portion of d^ 1985 partM payment was principal arri w ^ 
interest 
More importantly, the Closing Memorandum requires that White Pine must have paid $140,000.00 in 
principle above that which was already paid for Lot 6 in order to be equitably entitled to an additional PUD unit 
from die unplatted properly. Our examination of the findings and the record reveals to White Pine had not done 
so. 
Thus, the court conecdy concluded that White Pine was not entitled to a r y p o i t ^ 
VH. THE ROADWAY 
The district court concluded that the Cbnttact pro\ddes that Whte 
Roadway to any unrekased and unpaid for land as security in case of defedt by White Pine. The court also 
concluded that die parties modified the Contract to provide that owners and purchasers of the unplatted acreage, 
including Sharps and their successors in interest, would be entitled to use die Roadway for access to die unplatted 
property. The court concluded that this nxxlificatm was "memorialized l y te 
evidenced by the part pertbcmance and reliance of the Sharps on such letters and agreement in executing die 
Consent to Record." In die alternative, die court held that die Consent to Record in effect conveyed the Roadway 
in compliance with die modification. 
White Pine claims die court9 s conclusions constitute legal error because die Contract unambiguously created a 
duty for Sharps to release the Roadway in fee simple to White Pine. White Pine argues that Sharps cannot meet 
this requirement to release tiirough die creation of an easem^OTtiirou^ the Ctons^ to Record. White Pine also 
claims die court erred in condudir^ that die parties had modified die Cbn^ 
The Closing Memorandum reveals diat White Pine had paid Sharps $620,000.00. The document provides, 
widi our emphases, that upon payment of this sum, and upon "die recordation of the PUD Plat and Declaration of 
Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions widi die Summit County Recorder, [White Pine] shall be entitled to die 
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release from die Deed of Tmst of diree (3) PUD lots of Buyer's choice togeflier widi die said roadway." The 
Closing Memorandum expressfy provides that it "may not be oralfy changed, modified, or terminated, except in 
writing, by the party ag9inst whom the same is sought to be enforced." 
[15] The plain language of the Closing Memorandum (FN5) unambiguous^ establishes that White Pine's 
equitable interest in the Roadway vested on Jufy 16,1981, the date it tendei^ the $620,000.00. Asweeariier 
discussed, the recording of the specified documents was a condition precede to the 
release, but didrwtaflfect White Pine's vested interest Burroughs v. Garner, 43 Md.App. 302,405 A.2d 301, 
30&O9(1979). Because White Pine's vested irterestin the Roadway arose July 16,1981, the date of the executm 
of the Closing Memorandum, its right to receive die Roadway would survive any modification or subsequent 
breach. Given that the release could not be piactically be realized urtfl 
and the Covenants were filed, the Burroughs case would allow for the right to vest even though the land had not 
yet been platted. Thus the district rourt e n ^ 
regarding the Roadway. We therefore reverse that conclusion. 
Vm. BENEFIT OF THE BARGAIN DAMAGES 
While Pine challenges the di Specifically, White 
Pine claims it is entitled to die difference between the purchase price of the property that should have been released 
and the fair market value as of the date of Sharps' wrongful refusal to release. 
[16] In awarding damages for breach of contract, courts attempt to plare 
positmasiftheaxtratfhadbe Alexander v. Blown, 646 P.2d 692,695 (Utah 1982); Keller v. 
Deseret Mortuary Q).,23 Utah 2d 1,455 P.2d 197,198(1969). Wh^thecortractrartemplatestim^ 
payiraiof installm^ ... will 
attempt to place the parties in the positm 
manr»." Dillir^ham Commacial Co. v. Spears, 641 P.2d 1,10 (Alaska 1982). 
[171 This* when specific performance ism order, the buyer may b^ 
profits, while the seller rmy be etfitled to i r t e ^ Eiasonv. 
Watts, 615 P.2d 427,431 (Utah 1980) (citirg Pearce v. IWrd Ave. Improvement Co., 128 So. 396 (Ala.1930)). 
[18] Here, the district court found that White Pine's damages were "too remote, conjectural and speculative," 
and that White Pine "Med to establish it [has] suffered actual damages resulting from any alleged teach by 
[Sharps]." 
This is a finding of feet, which we have previously affirmed. Saunders v. Sharp, 793 P.2d 927,931 (Utah 
App.1990). likewise, we have already affirmed the finding that Shaips did rrt 
possession of the property. Id. Given these findings, there is no basis fcr a condusionttiat White Pine sustain 
benefit of the bargain damages. Thus, the court correctly declined to mate such a conclusion. 
IX. CX)NSTRUOION INTEREST 
White Pine claims the court erred in refasir^ to admk evidence of team 
company for exxtfruction loans for improvements on the 
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property. White Pine obtained these loans after the parties executed the Contract 
During trial, Sharps objected to the admission of evidence gpirg to interest on c ^ ^ Thecourt, 
relying cm Ranch Homes, Ire. v. Greater Park City Corp., 592 P.2d 620 (Utah 1979) sustained the objection, 
presumably because it found the evidence to be irrelevant 
[19] The trial court's construction of Ranch Homes and its attendant decision to bar admission of the evidence 
present questions of lawwhich we review for correctness. Grayson Roper Ltd. Partnership v. Finlinson, 782 P.2d 
467,470 (Utah 1989); City of W. Jordan v. Retirement Bd., 767 P.2d 530,532 (Utah 1988). 
In Ranch Homes, the developers purchased an optm to h ^ thirty aoes of real propaty. Ranch Homes, 592 
P.2dat622. After the developers exercised the option, the sellers repudiated the temis of the o p t ^ TheUtah 
Supreme Court reversed the trial court's award of damages incurred by the developers prior to their exercise of the 
option M. at625-26. 
Special damages are "those damages which arise from the special c m ^ ^ They have been 
said to be such damages as, by competent evidence, are directly traceable to failu^ 
obligation." Id. at 624 (footnote omitted). The supreme court emphasized that special damages mustbe 
foreseeable at the time of contracting. Id. nMa^ knowledge of possible hann is ret enough; the defendant must 
have reason to foresee, as a probable result of the breach, the damages claimed. Furthermore, before reliance 
damages may be awarded, the amount of the expenditure must be found to have been reasonably made." Id. 
[20] In the present case, our ruling that White P t e has a vested irterest in Lot 6 but ro 
property, along with our affirmance of the court's finding that Sharps did not interfere with White Pine's efforts to 
maiket the property, rendersthe evidence irrelevant That is, White Pine's expenditures for construction interest a i 
land k is eititled to canrrt On the other hand, White Pine's expenditures for land it does 
not own and is not entitled to is too speculative to be recoverable, especially since it elected to cease making 
payments toward that property. 
We therefore hold that the court correctly concluded that evidence of i r i e r e s t ^ 
improvements on the property was irrelevant. 
X. ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS 
Each party claims k is cor t i^^ White Pine claims the trial 
court erred as a matter of law inawandir^ Sharps attorney fees because they breadied fe C White Pine 
asserts its contractual right to an award of attorney fees incurred at trial and on appeal. 
On theother hand, Sharps claimthe court correctfy awarded attorney fees. They ask this c c m to aflfirm their 
award and to award them additional fees on appeal. 
While courts may, in some situations, award attorney fees on an equitable basis, "attorneys fees, when 
awarded as alfowed by law, are awarded as a matte* of legsl right" Cabrera v. Cottrell, 694 P.2d 622,625 (Utah 
1985). 
One such instance occurs when the right is contractual. (FN6) In such cases, " 'the court does not possess the 
same equitable discretion to deny attorney's fees that it has when feshioning equitable remedies, or applying a 
statute \ \ t o k h a l t o w s t t e d i s ^ Cobabe v. Crawford, 780 P.2d 834, 836 (Utah 
App.1989) (quotkE Spinks v. Ctevron Cffl Co., 507 F.2d 216,226 (5th Or.1975)). 
[21] This, "[p]rovisions in written contracts providing for payment of attorney fees should ordinarily be 
honored by the 
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courts." Staoey Properties v. Wixen, 766 P.2d 1080,1085 (Utah App.1988), cert denied. 779 P.2d 688 (Utah 
1989) (quotirgSoflfev.Rkid, 659 P.2d 1082,1085 (Utahl983)). This includes attorney fees incurred on appeal. 
Management Servs. Corp. v. Development Assocs., 617 P.2d 406,40809 (Utah 1980); rcconiRedevelopmert 
Agerxy v. Daskalas, 785 P.2d 1112,1126 (Utah App.1989) cert, granted 795 R2d 1138 (Utah 1990). 
It also includes attorney fees incurred to seek speriffc perfomnance. HacMari v. Snow, 657 P.2d 1271,1277 
(Utah 1982); Jones v. Hinkle, 611 P.2d 733,736 (Utah 1980); Cm v. Ehxh Smith Co., 781 P.2d 1292,1296 
(Utah App.1989). 
Here, the Contract provision sought to be enfoiced is part of the Closing Memorandum: 
Intheevertofbrea±ordefautto^ 
expenses of enforcing die same or any right arising out of breach or default thereof, including reasonable 
attorneys' fees, whether incurred with or without suit and both before and after judgment 
Thus, the Contract provides that the defaulting party pay all expenses of enforcement of a breach or default 
Here, both parties have defaulted. Thus, each defaulting party must pay reasonatte attorney fees associated with 
enforcing each default, including "air/ right arising out of breach or default thereof." 
[22] Neither party disputes that White Pine Med to timely pay taxes on Lots 1 to 6 and die Roadway. 
However, thedispute arose over the proper remedy for Mire to pay taxes and instaDmals. Because we conclude 
today that Sharps improperly refused to reconvey Lot 6 and die Roadway, we likewise conclude that Sharps may 
not collect attorney fees for seeking a remedy that is not a "right arising out of breach or default thereof." 
[23] However, Sharps' pursuit of White Pine for unpaid taxes on Lots 1 to 6 and the Roadway is a right 
arising out of the Cortract Thus Sharps are entitled to reasonable attorney fees expended in seeking those 
payments. Agsin, those attorney fees should not include those fees expeniedmdefendi^ 
Lot 6 and the Roadway. 
[24] Likewise, White Pine's suit for specific performance is a right arising ton Sharps' breach. We remand 
for the court to determine a reasonable attorney fee to be paid by Sharps for amounts reasonably incurred by White 
Pine at trial arri on appeal on the issues on wh We also remand for 
the court to deteranne a reasonable attorney fee incuned by Shaips in pursuirg White R 
Lots 1 to 6 and the Roadway. 
XL TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER 
[25] White Pine claims the court acted within its discretion in issuing die September 1986 TRO prevertirg a 
trustee's sale of Lot 6, the Roadway and all of the unplatted property. 
Sharps claim the TRO constituted an abuse of discretion because White Pine material^ breached the Contract, 
and because Shaips did not brcach. 
Because we have determined that White Pine is entitled to the release of Lot 6 and the Roadway, we affirm the 
restraining order until such time as Shaips have executed the releases in accordance with this opinion and with the 
directions of the trial court on remand. 
I N C L U S I O N 
To sum up our disposition of this complicated case, (1) we conclude the Contract is not ambiguous as it 
pertains to the issues discussed herein; (2) we reaffirm die trial court's findings relating to White Pine's obligation 
to pay property taxes on Lots 1 to 6 and the Roadway; (3) we reverse the court's conclusion regsrding Sharp's 
duty to release Lot 6 and remand for the court to order its release pursuant to the Contract and in accordance with 
this opinion; (4) we reverse the court's conclusion that Whte Pine is liable for unpaid i n s t a l ^ ^ 
interest thereon; (5) we affirm the court's conclusion that White Pine 
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has no right to conveyance of the unplatted property; (6) we reversethe court's c o a ^ i s m r ^ i x l i i ^ White Rne's 
liability for taxes on the unplattBd property; (7) we reverse the court's conclusion that the parties subsequently 
modified the Contract regflrding the Roadway; (8) we remand for the trial court to order Sharps to convey the 
Roadway; (9) we affirm the court's conclusion that White P t e is not ertided to benefit of feba^ 
(10) we affiimthe court's conclusion that evidence of constructm iriaest is irrelevarl; (11) we remand for the 
court to determine a reasonable attorney fee to be paid by Sharps for amounts reasonably incurred by White Pine at 
trial and on appeal as a result of White Pine's suit for specific performance of the release of Lot 6 and die Roadway 
and for other amounts reasonably expended in enforcing the Contract "or any right arising out of breach or default 
thereof; (12) we remand for the court to determine a reasonabfe attorn^ fee irnraed by 
White Pine for unpaid taxes on Lots 1 to 6 and the Roadway; and (13) we affirm the restraining OKkrbarring 
Sharps ftom disposing of the property. 
JACKSON, J., cxmirs. 
ORME, J., concurs,- except that as to section VIIII concur only in the result 
FN1. A "PUD" is a Planned Unit Development, a private residential development having some characteristics in 
common with a subdivision and condomin^^ 
Utah Code Arm. Sec. 57*1(1990) . SteJSaunders, 793 P.2d at 929 a 2 for farther definition 
FN2. Sharps cite Watdhie for the propositm 
when determine whether to o r ^ In Watchie, the buyer had defaulted on payments 
ofpriraple as well as taxes. Watchie, 448 P.2d at 363. The Watchie court noted that the "general rule" as 
to "whether such a covenant for partial release continues to be enforceable after a default depends upon die 
woiriir^ofthecovenartandthefk^ Id. at 362. In Watchie, 
the court irterpreted lar^uage in the cortact to mean that the buyer m 
conveyance, not that a defkift on taxes absolutely and Thecourt 
essentially affirmed the release order based on the language of the cortract "the decree does require that all of 
the taxes on all of the property must be paid before the partial tramfo of propoty occurs." Id. at363. The 
court thai ordered buyer to become current on taxes within sixty days, anl it ordered seller to release the land 
in question. Id. at 364. 
FN3. As we discuss later, White Pine's liability for taxes is restricted to that incurred on Lots 1 through 6 and the 
Roadway. 
FN4. White Pine argues that its obligate to pay interest and m Our holding 
that White Pine is not entitled to the unplatted property and that it is not obligated to pay installments, interest or 
taxes on this property disposes of this issue. 
FN5. Language in the plat, the Consent to Record and the Cbvenarts recorded on D e o e ^ ^ 1983, also 
supports the conclusion that White Pine's equitable interest in the Roadway vested when it tendered the 
$620,000.00. That is, die plat indicated that the internal Roadway was to be private, and the Covenants 
provided that easements over the lots and common area properties "are hereby reserved by Declarant [White 
Pine], together with the right to grant and transfer the same." 
FN6. Utah has a statute provki^ However, this 
section, Utah Code Ana Sec. 78-27-56.5, enacted in 1986, is inapplicable here because the contract was 
executed in 1981. 
Utah Reporter, 155368 P.2d 
746R2d264, Davies v. Olson, (UtahApp. 1987) 
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Ron DAVIES and Dan Mehr, dba Davies & Mehr Construction, 
Plairtifls and Respondents, 
v. 
Timothy R. OLSON, William S. Lund, WasatchBank, Utah Valley 
Bank, and Household Finance Corporation, 
Defendants and Appellants. 
Ron DAVIES ani Dan Mehr, dba Davies & Mehr Construction, 
Plairtifls and Appellants, 
v. 
Timothy R. OLSON, William S. Luni, WasatchBank, Utah Valley 
Bank, and Household Finance Corporation, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
Nos. 860145CA, 860146CA. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
Nov. 24,1987. 
Construction company brought action against owners seeking recovery fix services in constructing duplexes. 
TheFbuiADistrirtCcurt, Utah County, Robert J. Bullock, J., found in fevor of construction conpany, and both 
parties appealed. TheCourtof Appeals, Billings, J., heklthat: (1) there was no enforceable written or oral 
contract absent meeting of minds as to contract price; (2) owners were not denied due process due to feet that 
judgment was based on quantum meruit, theory which was not pled; and (3) statutory interest was calculable fiom 
date on which owner signed settlement statemerlusedfordosirgonfinancir^. 
Affirmed in part, reversed in part and remanded. 
1. CONTRACTS k28(3) 
95 — 
951 Requisites and Validity 
951(B) Parties, Proposals, and Acceptance 
95k28 Evidence of Agreement 
95k28(3) Weight and sufficient 
UtahApp. 1987. 
Firriing to there was no enforceable written or oral cortr^ 
evidence to parties did not agree on cortract price and to cortracto 
2. ACCORD AND SATCSFACnONk4 
8 — 
8k4 Form of agreement of accord. 
UtahApp. 1987. 
Setden^ statement iixir^ sale i m ^ 
constitute "executory accord," because there was no meeting of the minds. 
3. TRIAL k6(l) 
388 — 
3881 Notice of Trial and Pteliminary Proceedings 
388k6 Notice of Trial 
388k6(l) In general. 
UtahApp. 1987. 
Hearing in civil action must be prefaced by timely notice which adequately infonns parties of specific issues 
they must be prepared to meet 
4. PLEADING k427 
302 — 
3Q2XVDI Waiver or Cure of Defects and Objections 
3Q2k427 Objections to evidence as not within issues. 
UtahApp. 1987. 
Issues not expressly raised in pleadings may be tried by implied consent of parties. 
5. CX)NSTiTUnONALLAWk310 
92 — 
92XH Due Process of Law 
92k304 Civil Remedks and Proceedings 
92k310 Rules of pleading. 
UtahApp. 1987. 
Proof of quasHxxlract under allegatim 
surprise or prejudice. U.S.C.A. Const Amend. 14. 
6. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW k310 
92 — 
92XH Due Process of Law 
92k304 Civil Remedies and Proceedings 
92k310 Rules of pleading. 
[See headnote text below] 
6. PLEADING k427 
302 — 
302XVHI Waiver or Cure of Defects and Objections 
3Q2k427 Objections to evidence as not within issues. 
UtahApp. 1987. 
Defendants in breach of contract action were not denied due process due to trial court's award of damages 
based on unpkd theory of quantum meruit, where surjjkmertal hearirg fixused m 
underlying cost breakdown under construction contract, and m additional c»sts plairtffi 
defendant's requested changes in specifications. U.S.C.A. Const Amend. 14. 
7. APPEAL AND ERROR kll78(6) 
30 — 
30XVII Determination and Dispcotion of Cause 
30XVE(D) Reversal 
30kll78 Ordering New Trial, and Directing Further Pirceedir^m Lower Coirt 
30kl 178(6) Ordering new trial of certain issues only. 
UtahApp. 1987. 
In contractor's acttm to recover for costs i rarn^m 
contractor damages based on theory of quantum meruit, but which gave owner credk for 
initial cost breakdown was inconsistent, and requited remand for detemiinaticn of damage 
8. IMPLIED AND CONSTRUCTIVE CONTRACTS k55 
205H — 
205HI Nature and Grounds of Obligation 
205HI(D) Effect of Express Contract 
205Hk55 In general. 
UtahApp. 1987. 
Recovery under quantum meruit presupposes that no erfaceabb written OT oral coita 
9. IMPLIED AND CONSTRUCTIVE CONTRACTS k2.1 
205H — 
205HI Nature and Grounds of Obligation 
205HI(A) In General 
205Hk2 Constructive or Quasi Contracts 
205Hk2.1 In general. 
Formeriy 2Q5Hk2 
UtahApp. 1987. 
Elements of "quasi-contract," or contract implied in law, are: defendant received benefit; appreciation or 
knowledge by defendant of benefit; under circumstances that would make it u i ^ fee defendant to retain benefit 
without paying for it 
See publication Words and Phrases for other judicial obstructions and definitions. 
10. IMPLIED AND CONSTRUCTIVE CONTRACTS kl 10 
205H — 
205HO Actions 
2Q5HII(D) Amount of Recovery 
2Q5HkllO In general. 
UtahApp. 1987. 
Measure of recovery under quaskxDnttact,crccrttactinpIiedinlaw, is value of benefit conferred on 
defendant, and not detriment incurred by plaintiff, or necessarily reasonable value of plaintiff's services. 
See publication Words and Phrases for other judicial constructions and definitions. 
11. CONTRACTS k27 
95 — 
951 Requisites and Validity 
951(B) Parties, Proposals, and Acceptance 
95k27 Implied agreements. 
UtahApp. 1987. 
Elements of "axtract implied in tact" are: defendant requested plaintiff to perform work; plaintiff expected 
defendant to compensate him or her for those services; and defendant knew or should have known that plaintiff 
expected compensation. 
See publication Words and Phrases for odier jiidicM constructiore and deiMions. 
12. INTEREST k37(l) 
219 — 
219H Rate 
219k37 After Maturity of Debt 
219k37(l) In general. 
UtahApp. 1987. 
Statutory legal rate of interest is applied from date payment is due to judgment date. U.C.A. 1953,15-1-1. 
See publication Words and Phrases for other judicial 
13. INTEREST k39(2.30) 
219 — 
219m Time and (Computation 
219k39 Time from Which Interest Runs in General 
219k39(2.5) Prejudgment Interest in General 
219k39(2.30) Contract and sales matters. 
UtahApp. 1987. 
Day on which settlement statement was signed which was used at closing on financing fOTconstmcticn 
was day that owner ackrcwtelged obligate and 
determination of interest due thus began on that date. U.C. A. 1953,15-1-1. 
Page 746 P.2d 265 follows 
Dallas H. Young, Jr., Jeny L. Reynolds, Provo, for defendant and appellant 
GaryD. Stott,LynnS. Davies, Salt Lake City, for defendants and respondents. 
Before GARFF, ORME and BHIJNGS, JJ. 
BILLINGS, Judge: 
Both parties appeal from the trial court's May 17,1985 judgment against defendant Olson, purporting to award 
plaintifls their reasonable costs (plus irterest) incurred ^ We affirm the 
trial court's finding that there was no contract, and the court's conclusion that quantum meruit was, therefore, the 
proper theory of recovery. We, however, reverse the fiixlir^ of no liability We 
remand for findings as to whether he (1) requested plaintifls to perfomi woric and if so, to what extent, and/or (2) 
received any benefits as a result of plaintifls' construction of the duplexes, and an entry of a judgment consistent 
with those findings and o u r o p m m We farther reverse the trial court's calculation of damages against defendant 
Olson and remand for a detemiination of te 
and an entry of a judgment in that amount against defendant Olson. 
FACTS 
The following feds were developed in a bifurcated trial held on five nonconsecutive days over a two-year 
eight-irorth period. (FN1) Plaintiff Davies and defendant Olson orally agreed that Davies would construct fcur 
duplexes for Olson. The parties originally agreed that plairtiff Davies waikl construct the di^ 
$6,000 builder's profit per duplex." Based on this oral agreement, plaintiff Davies prepared a cost breakdown and 
submitted it to Wasatch Bank for acquisition of loi^-tem financing, and to defendant Olson. Subsequently, 
defendant Olson requested mmerous changes and additions to the original specifications for the duplexes. 
Soon thereafter, defendants, in an attempt to establish a ceiling price on the 
P ^ 746 P.2d 266 follows 
cost of construction at $72,070 per duplex, prepared a cortrart and s u ^ In his letter to 
plaintiffs, defendant Olson stated that the purpose of the proposed contract was "mainly to satisfy [defendant] Lund" 
as he was concerned about fixing a ceiling price. This contract, however, was never executed. 
A settlement statement, dated July 7,1981 and signed by defendant Lund, fixed the contract sales price at 
$128,500. This settlement statement was used at the closing with Wasatch Bank. Wasatch Bank provided 
permanent financing, which was mifficient to cover p l a i n t Consequently, plaintifls 
initiated an action against, among others, defendants Olson and Lund, alleging claims of fiaud, breach of contract, 
and foreclosure of mechanics' liens. (The foreclosure claim was resolved). 
After the initial trial on August 2,1982 and September 13,1982, the trial court entered judgment on August 4, 
1983 against defendants Lund and Olson for $23,741.54 (FN2) plus 12% inters 1981. 
The court found there was no agreement among the parties as to the total price to be paid for the construction of 
the duplexes. The court, however, based on the initial cost breakdown prepared by plaintiff Davfc^ 
defaidants jointly liable for $23,741.54. The court then found that plaintifls w o e addiiionalfy entitled to recover 
from defendant Olson the reasonable costs incurred because of defendant Olson's requested changes in the duplex 
specifications. (FN3) The court then directed counsel to negotiate and submit a figure as to the reasonable costs 
plaintifls incurred because of defendant Olson's requested changes. The parties failed to reach an agreement 
Consequently, a supplemental hearing was held on April 4,1985, April 10,1985, and April 16,1985, focusing on 
the following issues previously reserved by the trial court 
1. What were the plans and specifications upon which plairtifls and defendartsreM 
2. What modifications were subsequent mate to those plam arri specificate 
requests? 
3. What were the reasonable costs of the requested modifications which were actually made by plairtiflfef? 
The trial court, in its final judgment of May 17,1985, found there was no meeting of the minds between the 
parties "as to plans and specifications which formed the basis of the cost breakdown," and, therefore, that it erred in 
basir^ its August 4,1983 judgment on that document The court concluded that in order to prevent unjust 
enrichment of defendant Olson, plaintifls were entitled to recover their reasonable costs of construction from him. 
The court, however, was silent: as to defendant Lund's liability. The court awarded plaintifls $51,773.96 plus 
interest "at the legal rate of interest," accruing from July 7,1981, the date the settlement statement was executed. 
The trial court calculated the May 17,1985 judgment as follows: 
Reasonable cost of construction $366,703.96 
Less adjustment for water metes 1,350.00 
NET CONSTRUCTION COST 365,353.96 
Less the Amount of the August 4 
Judgment (FN4) 313,580.00 
May 17,1985 Judgmsnt to Haintiffi $51,773.96 
Both parties appeal ftom the May 17,1985 judgment 
L SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE 
[1] On appeal, we are asked to determine whether there is sufficient evidence to support die trial court's finding of no 
enforceable written or oral contract The 
P ^ 746 P.2d 267 follows 
trial court's findings of 6ct will not be set aside unless "ckarfyenOTeous." Utah RCrv.P. 52(a); State v. Wright, 744 P.2cl 
315 (Utah aApp.1987); State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191,193 (Utah 1987). A review of to record amply supports tte trial 
court's findings (1) that t ^ 
(2) that there was no meeting of the minds as to which plans and specifications formed the basis of die cost breakdown 
prepared by plaintiff Davies; and (3) that the parties did not i i ^ ^ 
Testimc^ at trial cmflicted sign^ Plaintiff Davies testified that he and defendant Olson 
orally agreed tot plaintiff Davies would construct the four duptexes fo 
Defendant Olson, on the other hand, while concedirg that cost plus $6,000 was d i s^ 
open-ended deal. Subsequeit to to oral conversation 
a cost breakdown and submitted it to Wasatch Bank and to defendant Olson. Thereafter, defendart Olson prepared a written 
contract with a provision tot cost was not to exceed $72,070 per duptex, evidendy att 
concern about cost Defendar* Olson preseried this p r q x ^ 
sign it This contract, however, was never executed. 
Given the disparity in the testimony legending the contract price, the trial court's finding that there was no meeting of the 
minds as to the contract price is not clearly erroneous. 
[2] We also affirm die trial court's finding that the settlement statement used for closing on the financing did not constitute 
an "executory accord," because there was no meeting of fee minds. See Golden Key Realty, Inc. v. Mantas, 699 P.2d 730, 
733 (Utah 1985); Sugqrhouse Finarre Co. v. Anierson, 610 P.2d 1369,1372 (Utah 1980). Tte settlement statement lists 
the contract price as $128,500. At trial, cxxiflicting t e s t i n g was introduced r ^ ^ 
tothisfigure. Defendant Olson testified that he n e ^ agreed to a contract p r i s m a Similarly, 
defendant Lund's position is that he signed the settlement statement merely to assist defendant Olson to acquire long-term 
financing, but that the settlement statement did not constitute an adorcwfe After 
reviewing the record, we do not believe the trial court's finding that the parties did not intend the settlement statement to 
constitute an executoiy accord is dearly erroneous. 
H. DUE PROCESS 
Defendants contend that they were denied due process of law because the trial court's May 17,1985 judgment was based 
on quantum meruit, a theory which was not pled, HOT r e s e n t Wedisagree. 
[3][4][5] A hearing must be prefaced by timely notice which adequately informs the parties of the specific issues they mus 
be prepared to meet Nelson v. Jacobsen, 669 P.2d 1207,1212 (Utah 1983). Issues not expressty raised in the pleadings, 
however, may be tried by the implied consent of the parties. General Ins. Co. v. Cknicero Dynasty Corp., 545 P.2d 502, 
506 (Utah 1976). Implied consent may be found where evidence is irtroduoed without o b ^ ^ Id. Moreover, proofofa 
quasi-contract under an alkg3tion of a brea± of an express contract does not v ^ 
North Tillamook County Sanitary Authority v. Great American Ins. Co., 46 Qr.App. 173,611 P.2d 319, 321 (1980). 
[61 Quantum meruit was, at least inferertiallv, an issue at the supplemental hearing. The supplemental hearing focused on 
the plans and specifications underlying die cost breakdown and the additional costs plaintifls incurred because of defendant 
Olson's requested changes in the duplex specifications. There is no stowing that defendants were surprised or prevented 
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from presenting all evidence pertaining to the reasonable costs of construction or the benefits defendants received, nor that thej 
were prejudiced by the trial judge relying on the theory of quantum meruit Fiirtheimore, any possible prejudice defendants 
may have suffered is cured by our remand for a new trial on the issue of damages. 
ffl. DEFENDANT LUND'S LIABILITY 
The trial court, in its final May 17,1985 judgmert, wither 
Lund of liability. The court did this although it had previously held him liable for the $23,741.54 j ^ Weareunable 
to ascertain whether the court found that defendant Lund requested plaintifls to perform services, and if so, to what extent, or 
whether any benefit was conferred upon defendant Lund by plaintifls'construct If defendant Lund 
requested services and received a benefit which would be unjustly retained, he is liable under quantum meruit (FN5) 
Consequently, we remand to the trial court for findir^ on this issue and an e r t r y o ^ 
IV. MEASURE OF DAMAGES 
Despite our approval of the trial court's decision to base recovery on quartum meant we, nonetheless, reverse the May 
17,1985 judgmert because we find that it E 
bits August 4,1983 judgment, the trial court based plairtifls'damages on the cost brea 
liable. 
[7] In its May 17,1985 judgment, the court determined that thoewasnomeedi^oftemindsastotheplansand 
specifications underlying the cost breakdown, revo^ its prior conclusion. The court, therefore, premised its May 17,1985 
judgment strictly on quartum meruit Nonetheless, in calculating the measure of damages assessed against defendant Olson, 
the court g^ve defendant Olson credit fix the August 4,1983 jucfemert-ajudgmert based on a theory that the court had 
rejected. Further, the court did not indicate whether cfefendart Luixl was stifl to 
h m By giving defendant Olson credit for the August 4,1983 judgm^ an earlier judgn^ 
judgment, on its fece, seems to supercede, the trial court, in eflfect, reduced the amount of plairtifls' recovery. The trial court 
did not indicate whether it intended the May 17,1985 judgment to be in addition to the August 4,1983 judgment, or instead 
ofit(FN6) In light of these observations, we find that tteMay 17,1985judgn^isirtemalfy 
patently unfeir to plairtifls under any irterpretation of the evidence. Therefore, we reverse and remand for a determination of 
damajges undo: quartum meruit 
[8] Because we remand for further proceedings, we attempt to provide some guidance to the trial court See Utah Farm 
Production Credit Ass'nv. Watts, 737 P.2d 154,158 (Utah 1987). Quantum meruit is an action initiated bv a plaintiff to 
recover payment for labor performed in a variety of circumstances in which thai plaintiff, for some reason, would not be able 
to sue on an express contract Recovery under quartum meruit presupposes that no enforceable written or oral contract exists. 
See Blue Ridge Sewer Improvement Dist v. Lowiy & Assos., Inc., 149 Ariz. 373,718 P.2d 1026 (CtApp.1986). 
Confiision surrounds the use and application of quartum meruit, see, e.g., Irterfomi Co. v. Mitchell, 575 F.2d 1270 (9th 
Cir.1978) (attempt^ to apply Idaho law); Hartwell Corp. v. Smith, 107 Idaho 134,686 P.2d 79 (CtApp.1984), because 
courts have used die tarns quartum mem! contract implied in feet, contract implied in law, quasi-contract, unjust enrichment 
and/or restitution without analytical precision. 
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See, e.g., Euramca Bcosys v. Roediger Pittsburgh, Inc., 581 F.Supp. 415,422 (E.DJQ1.1984) (discussing quaskortract , 
claim in quartum meruit litigation): Idaho Lumber, Inc. v. Buck, 109 Idaho 737, 710 P.2d 647, 655-57 (CtApp.1985); 
Sharp v. Laubersteimer, 347 N.W.2d 268,270 (Mirm.1984); Ellis-Jones, Inc. v. Western Waterproof Co., 66 N.CApp 
641, 64647, 312 S.E.2d 215,218 (1984). 
Quantum meruit has two distinct branches. Both branches, however, are rootedm''justice," see liikeshore Fia Corp. v. 
Comstock, 587 F.Supp. 426,429 (W.D.MkiU984), to prevent the defendant's enrichment at the plaintiffs expense. See 
Hazehvood Water Dist v. First Union Management, In:., 78 Qr.App. 226,715 P.2d 498 (1986). 
[9] [10] Contract implied in law, also known as quaskxxtract or unjust enrichment is one branch of quartum meruit A 
quasi-contract is not a contract at all, but rather is a legal action in restitution. See 1 A. Cabin, Corbin on Contracts Sec. 19, 
at 44,46(1963). The elements of a quaskxxtract, or a contract inplied in law, are: (1) the defendant received a benefit; Q 
an appreciation or knowledgeby the defendant of the benefit; (3) undo* circumstances that would nrake it unjust for the 
defendant to retain the benefit without payir^forit See Berrett v. Stevens, 690 P.2d 553, 557 (Utah 1984) (usirg the term 
"unjust enrichment"). The measure of recovery under quaskortract, cr cortract implied ^ 
conferred on the defendart (the de fend see First Inv. Co. v. 
Andersen, 621 P.2d 683,687 (Utah 1980), or necessarily the reasonable value of the plaintiffs services. 
[11] A contract implied in feet is the second branch of quantum meruit A contract implied in feet is a "contract" 
established by conduct ^ Restatement (Second) of Contacts Sec. 5 comment a (1981). The elements of a contract implied 
in feet arc: (1) the defendant requested the plaintiff to perfomiwodc; (2) the plaiiliff expected tte 
him or herfor those services; and (3) the defendant knew or should have known that the plaii^e?q)ectedcon^msatm 
SeeKirtz v. Read, 28 WasLApp. 731,626P.2d52,55 (1981); seeato Restatement (Second) of Contacts Sec. 5 commen 
a (1981) (providing that temis of promise or a g i r a r ^ are those expressed m language of p a ^ 
conduct); 1 S. Willistoa Williston on Contacts Sec. 3. at 8-10 (1957) (defining implied in fact contracts as obligations arising 
fiom mutual agreement and intert to promise where parties do not express a g ^ ^ lACcxbin , 
Corbin on Contacts Sec. 18 (1963) (noting that implied contracts impose contractive duty by reason of promissory expression 
and are no different than express contracts, althou^diflfan^innKxieof©q)ressingassal). 'Technically, recovery in 
contract implied in fact is the amount the parties intended as the contact price. If that amount is unexpressed, courtswill infer 
that the parties intended the amount to be the reasonable market value of the plaintiffs services." Kovacic, AProposalto 
Simplify Quantum Memit T itip t^inn1 35 Am.U.L.Rev. 547, 556 (1986). 
In the case before us, the trial court conecdy found that there was ro ^ 
must be based on quantum memit The court farther held that plairtifls should recover their reasonable costs of constructing 
the duplexes. The court correctly found a contract implied in feet It is undisputed that defendant Olson orally requested 
plaintiff Davies to construct the duplexes, that plairtifls expected Olson to compensate them for those services, and that Olson 
knew that plairtifls expected compensation. Thus, we remand as to defendant Olson for a detamination of the reasonable 
value of plairtifls' services in constructing the duplexes, and an entry of judgment against him for that amount. 
We are unable to determine what the court found as to defendant Lund. Thus we remand as to defendant Lund for 
findings on whether he requested plairtifls to perfomiwodc, and if so, to 
benefits as 
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a result of plairtifls' efforts. These findings wffl support te 
plairtiflfe under quantum memit - a contract implied in law, or quantum meruit - a contract implied in fact or neither. As is 
explained more fully supra, the measure of damages may differ depending on die theory adopted. 
V. INTEREST 
h awaiding damages, the applied The 1981 amendment to section 
15-1-1 increased the kgd rate of interest fiom 6 percent to 10 percent Utah Code Ana Sec. 15-1-1(1986). 
[12] The statutory kgfll rate of interest is applied ftom the date paymert is due to the j ^ ^ See IJgnell v. Berg, 
593 P.2d 800, 809 (Utah 1979). 
[13] The trial court found July 7,1981, the date defendant Lund signed the settlement statement, as the due date, as that 
was the date the benefit was conferred. It was also on this date that defendants acknowledged an obligation to pay plairtifls 
for their s e n i u m a^nstructingttiedLplexes. We find that this determination is si^ported by substantial evidaice a ^ 
therefore win not distu* it on appeal. See id. at 810. Based on this factual detemiination, we find the appropriate rate of 
interest is 10 percent 
The May 17,1985 judgment is aflBimedin part and reversed in part 
consistent with this opinion. Each party to bear its own costs. 
The case is remanded for further proceedings 
GARFF, aid ORME, JJ., amir. 
FNl. The first trial was held on August 2,1982 and September 13,1982. The supplemental hearing was held on April 4, 
1985, April 10,1985, and April 16,1985. The confusion and inconsi^^ 
unfortunate interruptions in the trial. 
FN2. The court found the cost per duplex to be $78,395. Multiplying that figure by the number of duplexes built (4), and 
subtracting the construction costs paid by defendants, $289,838.46, yielded a judgment in the amount of $23,741.54. 
FN3. The court did not enter judgment against defendant Lund for this additional recovery, finding that defendant Lund 
merely assisted defendant Olson in acquiring long-term financing. 
FN4. The court credited defendant Olson with payment of $78,395 per duplex, multiplied by the number of duplexes built 
(4), or $313,580. ^ N o t e ^ a p a , 
FN5. Of course, the court, on remand, could find other theorte of ieco\^ag?in^ 
including partnership or joint venture. 
FN6. The earlier judgment was not made final pursuant to Utah RCiv.P. 54(b) and therefore would seem to be kgfllly 
merged into or superceded by the May 17 final judgmer*. 
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SHORELINE DEVELOPMENT, INC., a Utah corporation, Milton 
Jones, and Milton Hanks, Flaintifls, Appellees, 
and Cross-Appellants, 
v. 
UTAH COUNTY and American Fork City, Defeiriait, Appellant, 
and Cross-Appellee. 
No. 910M-CA. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
July 10,1992. 
Alleged agent brought suit agsinst county for services rendered m obtainirg dredgi^ 
used by county on lake. The Fourth District Cburt, Utah Couity^ 
veidictmiavorofagentonur^enr^^ County appealed and agent cross appealed. The Court of 
Appeals, Bench, P.J., held that (1) claim for unjust enrichment was m 
Governmental Immunity Act, and (2) agent was not entitled to awaid of prejudgment interest 
Affirmed. 
1. APPEAL AND ERROR kl73(2) 
30 — 
30V Presentation and Reservation in Lo\^« Court of Gramds of Review 
30V(A) Issues and Questions in Lower Court 
30kl73 Grounds of defense or opposition 
30kl73(2) Natures subject-matte-in general. 
UtahApp. 1902. 
County's claim that corporate powers of county statute barred claim by alleged agent for unjust enrichment as 
result of its services in aiding county in obtain^ dredge, which claim \ ^ 
considered for first time on appeal. U.C.A. 1953,17-4-5. 
2. <X>UNTESk208 
10* — 
104X11 Actions 
104k208 Capacity to sue or be sued in general. 
UtahApp. 1992. 
Claim against couity by a g ^ 
was an equitable claim not barred by the Governmental Immunity Act, despite county's contention that it was 
actirg in effort to control floodirg. U.C.A. 1953,63-30-3. 
3. COUNTIES k223 
104 — 
lMXH Actions 
10ft223 Evidence. 
UtahApp. 1992. 
Jury's finding lhat county received benefit of $94,000, as iesuk of agrt's sendees m aiding rounty in obteining 
dredge was supported by sufficient evidence, even though c»urty never rnacfe use tf 
them from dredge because it was unable to find way to retrofit dredging pumps for use; county tailed to marshal 
evidence in support of $94,000 award, but only marshaled evidence showing efforts of agent and attempted to 
counter evidence with some evidence of efforts ©qpended by ccurty and state, marjjarert 
agent was not sole party involved in obtaining dredge. 
4. TRIAL k307(3) 
388 — 
388VHI CuaodyXorductardl^liheralionsofJury 
388k307 Taking papers or articles to jury room 
388k307(3) Dooimertary evidence and depositions. 
UtahApp. 1992. 
Trial court was not required to grant requests by jury during deliberations that deposition of witness, who had 
been unavailable to testify at trial, and whose derx^ sirkxi rad been read to jury, be sert to jury room Rules 
Ov.Proc.,Rule47(m). 
5. INTEREST k39(2.20) 
219 — 
219IH Time and Computation 
219k39 Time from wrMi interest runs in general 
219k39(2.5) Prejudgment interest in general 
219k39(2.20) Particular cases and issues. 
UtahApp. 1992. 
Agent, which obtained unjust eririchment award from county for agent's services in obtaining dredge, was not 
ertitled to award of prejudgment irierest; jury had discretion to award interest as part of equity judgment, so that 
there was risk of double recovery. 
6. INTEREST k39(2.15) 
219 — 
219HI Trmeard Qmputation 
219k39 Time from which interest runs in general 
219k39(2.5) Prejudgment interest in general 
219k39(2.15) Liquidated or unliquidated claims in general. 
UtahApp. 1992. 
Detemiining factor in awarding rwejudgrnent interest is whete dama 
calculated with mathematical certainty. 
7. INTEREST k39(2.15) 
219 — 
219m Tmrearxi Computation 
2 1 * 3 9 Time fromwhich interest nmsingeneral 
219k39(2.5) Prejudgment interest in general 
21*39(2.15) liquidated or unliquidated claims in general. 
UtahApp. 1992. 
If jury must determine loss by using its bestjudgmeri as to valuation r a t e to 
prejudgmal interest is inappropriate. 
8. INTEREST k39(2.20) 
219 — 
219m Time and Computation 
219k39 Tiir^ fian \^iich i r t o ^ iuns m g m ^ 
219k39(2.5) Prejudgment interest in general 
219k39(2.20) Particular cases and issues. 
UtahApp. 1992. 
Prejudgment interest must be sought directfy as damages in u i ^ e n r i d i m a ^ 
subsequent^ added by trial court to jury's award for unjust enrichment 
Kay Btyson and Jeril B. Wilson, Provo, for appellant 
Gregory J. Sanders, Salt Lake City, for appellees. 
Page 835 P.2d 208 follows 
Before BENCH, BILLINGS ani RUSSON, JJ. 
AMENDED OPINION ON REHEARING (FN*) 
BENCH, Presidirg Judge: 
Shoreline Development, Inc., brought suit against Utah County for services rendered by Shoreline in obtaining 
dredging pumps intended to be used by the Courty on Utah Lake. The trial court entered a partial directed verdict 
m the Courty's fevor dismissirg Shore Shoreline's unjust enrichment claim, however, was 
sent to the jury. The jury found in Shoreline's favor and awarded k $94,(XX3 for te savices raidaed. The 
County appeals and Shoreline cross-appeals. We affirm. 
FACTS 
In 1985, Shoreline entered into an agreement with American Fork City (FN1) to operate a boat harbor the 
City owned on Utah Late, which is located in UtahCounty. It was determined that a dredge was necessaryto 
develop the harbor. Shoreline begpn to investigste ways of obtain^ a dredge and ended u^ 
Arseneau, the Director of State Surplus Property. They identified certain surplus fedaal government dredges tot 
could be released for use on this project Ihe principals of Shoreline spertmany hours working on the project in 
1985. Ifeginning in the early part of 1986, th^waeeachwoddi^onlteproje^ 
week. 
Inmid-March, 1986, a meeting was held with the Utah Courty Commission to d i ^ ^ 
by Shoreline for American Fork. Mthire of the rourty commissioner 
courty engineer. During the meeting, Shoieline outlined a proposal wherety it would obt^ 
Courtyarxi be given the exclusive rights to operate k on Ut^ L ^ . Shoreline indicated it was focusing its efforts 
upon te dredge "Harding" whkfo belong to the AmwCta^ 
The dredge had two large dredging pumps that couki be salv^^ for the Ctourty. The Gmnissm took a voice 
vote and authorized expenditure of $2,000 to get the project going. 
Immediately after the meeting, Shoreline prepared a letter menxrializi^ 
with the commissioners. That letter was hand carried to the Granission the next day. When the written 
memorialization of the agreement was delivered, a die± for $2,(X^ No express written 
contract was executed by die parties. 
Shoreline then moved forward ur i^ 
and set up business operate Shoreline presented the County with written reports concerning its 
investigation. Shoreline again met with two of the courty comnMsskxios to discuss the project m 
dredge Harding in particular. Shoreline claims that the commissioners agam took an express^ 
specifically authorized Shoreline to proceed with oblainirg a dredge fcr the <^^ Ore of the principals of 
Shoreline remembers a commissioner ^ecifically statir^ to no bid process was requ^ 
agreement to be made. 
A f e this second meeting with ti^ 
pun^oflFtheltod^fotheQxirty. IneariyJuneof 1986, it becameknown that the dredging pumps were 
going to make it to Utah. The principals of Shoreline then r ^ 
including the mayor of AmaicanFbric. They were totally surprised inthat meetii^ whenfe commissioners 
thanked ten for their efforts in obtaining fe dredging pumps and t 
Qneofthecommissbnerssu 
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Afler Shoreline had bear excused from the deal, the govemnaert pcpowxxk was con^ 
pumps woe delivered to the Courty. The county's engineer signed one document acknowledging that fee value of 
the dredge was $6,022,563. Courty commissioner Gary Anderson, in acc^ting tfie dredge, ^so signed a 
document acknowledging its value at $6,022,563. 
Shoreline presented a bill for $250,000 to the Ccurtyfrc the value tf The 
Courty refused to pay the bill and Shoreline brought suit Shoreline claimed the County was liable undo* an 
express cortractiMagreemert: that Shordre In the alternative, Shoreline 
claimed that if tee was no express contract, the County was liable undo* an inpbed-in-fect contract as evidenced 
by the work actually performed by Shoreline. As a final alternative, Shoreline claimed tiiat the County was liable 
for the unjust enrichment it received from Shoreline's efforts. 
At the close of Shoreline's evidence, the County moved for a directed verdict as to the express contract and the 
inplied-in-fect contract claims. The Courty argued that it was protected irom ar^ cortiactu^ 
not act in accoidance with stale code or its own customaiy practices in dealing with Shoreline and therefore it could 
not be bound by those acts. The County conceded at that time that the u i ^ e n r i c h n ^ claim 
presented to the jury. Tte trial court agreed and graiied a d irec t 
first two claims. The County thai rested, without puttirgmary case of its own, ar^ 
was s a l to the jury. The jury awarded Shoreline $94,000 for services rendered. Shoreline thai requested 
prejudgment interest on the $94,000, but the trial court denied the request 
The Courty appeals, claiming it is shielded firm fe u r ^ enrich^ Sec. 17-4-5 
(1991) (corporate powers of a courty), and by Utah Code Arm. Sec. 63-30-3 (1989) (the Utah Governmental 
Immunity Act). (FN2) The Courty also challenges the sufficiency of the evidence as to w h e t e ^ 
benefit from Shoreline's efforts. And finally, the Courty claims tot the trial cxxirt ared in refasing to altaw the 
jurytotakeirrtothejuryrocxnadepo Shoreline cioss-appeals the denial of 
prejudgment interest, claiming toiriaestmaybeawaidedmanur^em (FN3) 
UNJUST ENRICHMENT 
Defenses 
[1] The Courty asserts that Shorelte^ Sec. 17-4-5 
(1991). This defense was not raised below. We will not address issues raised for the first time on appeal. See 
ZkxE First Nat Bank v. National Am. Titte Ins. Co., 749 P.2d 651,654 (Utah 1988). 
[2] The Courty also asserts that Shoreline's unjust enrichment claim is barred by the Governmental Immunity 
Act, Utah Code Ann Sec. 63-30-3 (1989), because the Cburty was actirg in an effort The 
supreme court has clearly held that "governmental immunity may not be used as a defense to equitable claims...." 
Board of Educ. of Gianite School DisL v. Salt Lake Courty, 659P.2d 1030,1036 (Utah 1983) (quantum meruit 
claim upheld where courty "acquiesced in the receipt of the benefit"). (FN4) Shoreline's 
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unjust enrichment claim is therefore not barred by the Governmental Immunity Act 
Sufficiency of the Evidence 
[3] The Courty challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support a finding that the Courty received a 
benefit in the amount of $94,000. In particular, the County argues that fe benefit of Shoreline's s e n ^ 
have been $94,000 because the County received no "net benefit" from obtaining the dredge. After the dredging 
pumps w o e removed from the dredge, the Courty never made use of ten. The Courty argues that it was 
simply unable to find a way to retoft the In feet, the federal government 
ultimately repossessed them. The County ens, however, in focusing on the "net beneft" of the ertire transacts 
The appropriate benefit upon \ ^ ^ 
be awarded, is the service rendered by Shoreline in obtaining the dredge. The feet that following the receipt of this 
benefit the County was unsuccessful in making a profitable use of the dredge is immaterial to the valuation of 
Shoreline's services. The County, not Shoreline, bore the risk the verture might feil. 
The County has failed to satisfy its burden of maishaliig the evidence in support ^ 
received a bereft worth $£t,000. Hodges v. Gibson Prod. Co., 811 P.2d 151,156 (Utah 1991) (appellant must 
set out all evidence that supports jury verdict, including all valid inferences, and demonstrate "that reasonable 
personswould not conclude that tte evidence supports tte verdict"). The County does marshal the evidence 
showirg the efforts of Shoreline and attempts to courier it with some evidence of the efforts expended by the 
County and the State in an apparent attempt to show that Shoreline was not tte sole party 
dredge. The primary focus of the Cbunty's nraKhalin& 
the venture. The County has not marshaled the evidence in support of tte $94,000 award. Nowhere in the 
County's attempt to marshal is there any indication that tte services re 
worth$94,000. We therefore do not disturb the jury award. &ea_eig1JState v. Christoflferson, 793 P.2d 944,917 
(Utah App.1990) (when appellant foils to marshal, revfewir^ court presumes that te 
supported by the dear weight of the evidence). 
DEPOSITION 
[4] During its deliberations, the jury requested that the deposition of William Arseneau be sent into the jury 
room. Due to the unavailability of Aiseneau, his depositm had been readmit 
The trial court refused to allow the deposition tote sent to tte juiy room because 
might receive more weightthan other oral testimony. The County argues that the trial court erred in not altowing 
the jury to review the deposition. 
Under Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 47(m), the jury may not take depositions with them when they deliberate. 
(FN5) The question of whether written testimoitysh^ 
in State v. Solomon, 96 Utah 500, 87 P.2d 807, 811 (1939), wherein tte supreme court teki: 'Tte law does rx* 
permit depositions or witnesses togptothejuryroom." (FN6) 
In light of Rule 47(m) and the supreme court's unequivocal holding that depositions are not permitted in the 
jury room, we find no error. 
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PREJUDGMENT INTEREST 
[5] In its cross-appeal, Shoreline challenges the trial court's refusal to award prejudgment interest on the 
$94,000 urgust enrichment award. Shoreline asserts that prejudgment irierest shouM 
enrichment claim M s somewhere between die poles of express contract claims, where prejudgment interest is often 
allowed, and tort claims, where prejudgmert irterest is s e k t o In particular, Shoreline asserts that the 
similarity between an unjust enrichment claim arid a c o n t ^ 
interest Shoreline's reliance on the nature of tte claim, towevrc, is misplaced. 
[6] [7] The determine 
prejudgment interest is sought can be cakxilated with m See, e.g.. JackB. Parson Constr. Co. 
v. State, 552 P.2d 107,10&O9 (Utah 1976) (amour* due under tte c o n t r a c t s "A 
court can award prejudgment interest only when tte loss is fixed at a particular tin^ 
with accuracy." Smith v. linmar Energy Cdrp., 790 P.2d 1222,1225 (Utah App.1990). If tte jury must 
determine the loss by using its best judgment as to valuatm rather than fixed star^ 
interest is inappropriate. M._S^_Bjork v. April Indus., Inc., 560 P.2d 315, 317 (Utah) cert, denied. 431 U.S. 
930,97 S.Q. 2634,53 L.Ed.2d 245 (1977) (where damages cannot be calculated with mathematical accuracy, tte 
amount of tte damage must be ascertained and assessed by tte trier of fact and prejudgment interest is not 
allowed); Fell v. UnionPac. Ry. Co., 32 Utah 101, 88 P. 1003,1006 (1907) ("In all... cases wtere tte damages 
are incomplete and are peculiarly within the province of the jury to assess at the time of the trial, no interest is 
permissible."). 
The Utah Supreme Court recently indicated that die lack of mathematical certainty generally prevents an award 
of prejudgment interest in equity claims. 
A survey of cur cases where prejudgment interest was awarded indicates that interest has been allowed in 
actions for damage to personal property, in actions brought on a w r t o 
liquidated overpayment of water subscriptm charges, hi many of these cases, we stressed that the loss had 
been fixed as of a definite time and the amount of the loss can be calculated with mathematical a ^ 
accordant with wefl-establis^ No case has been cited to us where we have allowed 
prejudgmal interest in an action such as toe instart case, which is for equitabfer "A suit of this nature ... 
invokes consideration of the principles of equity which address themselves to the conscience and discretion of 
the trial court" In view of the highfy equitable n ^ ^ 
determining the amount, if any, to be [awarded to the plaintiff], we find no error indie denial of prejudgment 
interest 
Bellon v. Malnar, 808 P.2d 1089,1097 (Utah 1991) (citations omitted) (quotirg Fullmer v. Blood, 546 P.2d 
606,610 (Utah 1976)). 
Shoreline asserts that tee is a public policy ground for awarding interest in equity cases despite the uncertainty 
ofthedamages. While we recognize Shoreline's concern that injured parties be r ^ 
concern is adequately addressed by reason of the feet that equity plaintifis may claim lost interest as part of then-
damages. Uinta P^elineCcxp. v. White Superior^., 546P.2d885, 8 8 7 ( U ^ 
require, interest may be awarded as part of the damages). Since a jury has discretion to award interest as partofan 
equity judgment, there is a risk of double recovery if prejudgment: interest may be added to a jury's equity award 
by the trial court who does not know whether the jury's awair ico \^ interest In order to prevent such double 
recovery, we presume that if the claimant was entitled to any interest, it was awarded by the jury as part of the 
equity award. 
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[8] Given the risk of double recovery, and in light of the supreme court's ruling in Bellon, we hold that 
prejudgment interest must be sought directly as damages in urgustenri±mert cases, if at all. Prejudgment; interest 
may not be subsequertfy added by a trial court to a jury's award for u r ^ enrichment We therefore find no error 
in the trial court's refusal to award Shoreline prejudgment interest on the $94,000 judgment awarded by the jury. 
CONCLUSION 
AstotheCouity ' sappealof thejud^^ 
befowsowedonotaddressitforthefii&ti Furthemiore, the county may not raise governmental 
immunity as a cfefeise against an e q u i ^ As to the assertion that the trial court erred 
in refusir^ to alfow the deposition m f e As to Shoreline's cross-appeal requesting 
prejudgmal interest, we also find no error. Thejudgmotistho^oreafiSrmed. 
BILLINGS and RUSSON, JJ., a m i r . 
* Replaces this court's opinion of flie same name filed on May 19,1992 (187 Utah AdvJRep. 26). 
FN1. American Fork has settled with axxeline and is not a party to this appeal. 
FN2. Ihe Govemmertal I n r a i ^ See 
section 63-30-3(3) (Supp.1991). 
FN3. Shoreline also cross-appeals the dismissal of its cortract claims but o ^ 
if we reverse tte u r ^ enrichment award. Inasmuch as we affim the judgment, we need not address the trial 
court's legal conclusions as to die first two claims. 
FN4. &eje^Concrete Products Co. v. Salt Lake County, 734 P.2d 910,911-12 (Utah 1987) (quantum meruit 
claim was recognized as permissible, but claim Med for lack of evidence that county was directly benefitted); 
Bratlir^Bros. Constr., Inc. v. Utah Golden Spikers, In:., 597 P.2d 869, 872 (Utah 1979) (remarried for 
further proceedings regsrding quartum menik claim agpi^ 
presenting claim). 
FN5. Rule 47(m) provides, in relevant part and with our emphasis, "[u]pon retirirg ft* 
take with than the instructions of the court and all exhibits and all papeis which have been received as 
evidence in the cause, except depositions...." 
FN6. I t e supreme rourtreaffim^ its to 14-15 (Utah 1984). 
Utah Reporter, 155-868 P.2d 
808 P.2d 1089, Bellon v. Malnar, (Utah 1991) 
Copyright (c) West Publishing Co. 199* No claim to original U.S. Govt worics. 
ftigp 808 P.2d 1089 follows 
ArvinL. BELLON, Maurine G. Bellon, B. Curtis Dastrap, Lanis 
B. Dastmp, and A. Labium & Sons, Lie., Plaintiffs 
and Appellees, 
v. 
Marvel L. MALNAR, Defendant and Appellant 
No. 880226. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
March 29,1991. 
Assignees of defaulting vendee sued vendor for restitution of payments made prior to default and forfeiture. 
The Eighth District Court, Duchesne County, Boyd Bunnell, J., awarded judgment ag9inst vendor and in fevor of 
assignees in amount of $71,173.33. Vendor appealed. The Supren^ Court, Howe, Associate C.J., held that (1) 
vendor was entitled to proceeds ftom condemnation award as payment of damages to lands he repossessed 
inasmuch as vendee's equitable title was forfeited before award was made; (2) assignees were not entitled to 
appreciated value of property on which vendee defaulted; (3) \mtor was not entitled to loss of baig3^ 
when property had appreciated in value; (4) court would not enforce forfeiture clause inasmuch as enforcement 
would altow unconscionable recovery to vendor, and (5) assignees were not entitled to prejudgment iniereston 
award. 
Remanded for purpose of amendiqg judgment 
1. VENDOR AND PURCHASER k44 
400 — 
4001 Requisites and Validity of Contract 
4O0k44 Evidence. 
Utah 1991. 
Trial court's finding that vendor intended to convey tide to 6*cre tract of land to vendee at time of closing of 
real estate contract for 76 acres, rather than upon payment of $3,000 per acre over and above specified annual 
payments in contract, so as to require exelusm of 6 acres firm 1 
vendor was not clearly erroneous. Rules Civ.Proc., Rule 52(a). 
2. QUIEI1NG TITLE klO.l 
318 — 
3181 Right of Action and Defenses 
318k9 Tile of Plaintiff 
318kl0.1 Necessity of haviig title or interest 
Formerly 318klO(l) 
Utah 1991. 
Trial court was not authorized to quiet tide to 6^oe tract agsinst voider in suit by vendee's assignees for 
restitution of payments made by vendee prior to his default on contract for sale of 76 acres, where assignees of 
vendee never owned 6-acre tract and made no claim to it, and appropriate parties to quiet tide action were not 
before court 
3. VENDOR AND PURCHASER k341(5) 
400 — 
400VII Remedies of Purchaser 
400VH(A) Recovery of Purchase Money Paid 
400k341 P r o c e e d ^ 
400k341(5) Amount and items of recoveiy. 
Utah 1991. 
In restitution suit by vendee for paymerts made prior to defedt on real estate c ^ 
property was to be calculated at time of defkrtt, rather than at later d ^ 
acquiesce in forfeiture after default and interfered with marketable tide, where vendor failed to plead interference 
with marketable tide, and testified that b e t w ^ 
acquiescing in forfeiture, vendor made no attempt to resefl property or to l t e iwi fo 
4. VENDOR AND PURCHASER k341(3) 
400 — 
400VII Remedies of Purchaser 
400VH(A) Recovery of Purchase Money Plaid 
400k341 Prooedir^s 
400k341(3) Evident. 
Utah 1991. 
Trial court's factual finding that value of real property subject to real estate contract on which vendee defaulted 
was $180,000 was not clearly enoneous in view of uncortroverted expat testimony that land was worth $180,000 
at time of default 
5. EMINENT DOMAIN kl53 
148 — 
148II Compensation 
148H(D) Persons Entitled and Payment 
148kl51 Feisons Entitled 
148kl53 Vendor or purchaser. 
Utah 1991. 
Vendor was entitled to proceeds from condemnation award in payment of damages to lands she repossessed, 
where equitable title was forfeited by vendee before award of compensation was made, and vendee and his 
assignees stipulated that any proceeds would gp to vendor. U.C.A. 1953,78-34-9. 
6. VENDOR AND PURCHASER k341(5) 
400 — 
400VII Remedies of Purchaser 
400Vn(A) Recovery of Purchase Money Paid 
400k341 Proceedings 
400k341(5) Amount and items of recovery. 
Utah 1991. 
Vendee, who defaulted on property which had appreciated in value, was not ertided to appreci^ 
for restitution of payments made by vendee before default. 
7. VENDOR AND PURCHASER k341(5) 
400 — 
400VE Remedies of Purchaser 
400Vn(A) Recovery of Purchase Money Paid 
400k341 Proceedings 
400k341(5) Amount and items of recovery. 
Utah 1991. 
Appreciated value of property, on which vendee defaulted, negated vendor's entidement to damages for loss of 
advantageous bargain in vendee's restitution suit for payments made before default 
8. VENDOR AND PURCHASER k341(5) 
400 — 
400VH Remedfes of Purchaser 
400VII(A) Recovery of Purchase Money Paid 
400k341 Proceedings 
400k341(5) Amount and items of recovery. 
Utah 1991. 
Attorney fees expended by vendor in eminent domain actkn were not damages whkii vender c c ^ deduct in 
restitution suit by vendee for payments made prnr to vendee's default, where v e n ^ 
pay fees in absence of contract with vendee. 
9. VENDOR AND PURCHASER k341(5) 
400 — 
400VII Remedies of Purchaser 
400VII(A) Recovery of Purchase Money Paid 
400k341 Proceedings 
400k341(5) Amount and items of recovery. 
Utah 1991. 
Vendee's failure to return 6-acre tract, tide to which was conveyed at time of closing, upon vendee's default 
constituted item of vendor's damages in vendee's suit for restitution of payments made prior to default 
10. VENDOR AND PURCHASER k341(5) 
400 — 
400Vn Remedks of Purchaser 
400VII(A) Recovery of Purchase Money Paid 
400k341 Proceedings 
400k341(5) Amount and items of recovery. 
Utah 1991. 
Vendor's damages for vendee's nonreturn of fracre tract, title of which was conveyed at closing, represented 6 
times contract price of $2,000 per acre, not value of tract when buyer defaulted on land contract in vendee's 
restitution action for payments made prior to default, where vendor intended to convey title to 6-acre tract at 
closing. 
11. INTEREST kl3 
219 — 
2191 Rights and Liabilities in General 
219kl3 Default in payment in general. 
Utah 1991. 
Trial court properly allowed vendor interest on contract after default as alternative to fair rental value in 
vendee's restitution suit for payments made prior to default on land contract 
12. VENDOR AND PURCHASER k79 
400 — 
400D Construction and Operation of Contract 
400k79 Conditions and provisos. 
Utah 1991. 
Court would not enforce forfeiture clause in real estate contract, where recovery by vendor of over $26,000 in 
excess of actual damages indicated that liquidated damages bore no reasonable relationship to actual damages upon 
vendee's default 
13. CONTRACTS k318 
95 — 
95V Performance or Reach 
95k318 Discharge of contract by breach. 
Utah 1991. 
Supreme Court will enforce forfeiture clause in contract unless it finds that forfeiture would be so grossly 
excessive in relation to any realistic view of loss that might nave been contenplatedty 
shock the conscience that court of equity would refuse such forfeiture. 
14. INTEREST k39(2.30) 
219 — 
219HI Time and (Computation 
219k39 Timetrom Which Interest Runs in General 
219k39(2.5) Prejudgment Interest in General 
219k39(2.30) Contract and sales matters. 
Utah 1991. 
Vendees were not entitled to prejudgment interest on award in vendee's favor in suit for restitution of payments 
macte on laixi contort 
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Gordon A. Madsen, Robert C. Cummings, Salt Lake City, for defendant and appellant 
Robot F. Orton, Viiginia G n ^ 
HOWE, Associate Chief Justice. 
Defendant Marvel L. Malnar appeals from a judgment entered against ha* and in favor of plaintiffs, who are 
assignees of the buyer ina real estate cxxtract with Malnar as seller. The action was brought by plaintiffs for 
restitution of the payments made by the buyer before he defaulted and Malnar forfeited his interest in the contract 
and the property. 
I. FACTS 
On December 19,1980, plaintiffs' assignor, FenmEWer, entered irio a real e s t ^ 
Malnar 76 acres of land in IXchesne Cburty, t q g e t e The 
contract provided for a down payment of $23,500 and for annual installnrat payments of $26,345.18 beginning in 
December 1981. A warranty deed to the foil acreage was executed by Malnar and placed m escrow, with delivery 
conditioned upon compte A quitclaim deed from Eder to Malnar was also placed 
m escrow with instractions At the closing of the sale, 
Malnar executed a separate warranty deed to Elder for 6 acres of the land. This deed was then recorded, which 
Malnar now asserts was due to a mistake. 
Ekiermacfe the down paymert and the 1981 ar^ Early in 1984, when the 1983 
payment was past due, Malnarserved a notice of defalk upon Eder. The default was not cured, and 
subsequently, the quitclaim deed to the 76 acres from Elder to Malnar was delivered by the escrow agent to 
Malnar, who recorded it on February 3,1984. Malnar asserts that at that time approxinrately one year's interest 
had accrued in the amount of $10,247.80 and there were delinquent real estate taxes and water assessments. 
Shortly after default, Eder assigned his tide and interest in the property ariicortatf 
Resources, which recorded a notice of irierest agsinst the entile 76 acres. One year after default, Elder conveyed 
die 6 acres to one Darnell 
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Didericksen, who thereafter encumbered it with a mortgage. 
On October 18,1982, while the contract was in force, Deseret Transmission commenced an action to 
condemn a right-of-way across the 76-acre tract to erect high-tension power lines. On March 7,1985, Malnar, 
Elder, and his assignees entered into a stipulation in that action that (1) Malnar was die owner of all the property, 
(2) Malnar was to receive the entire condemnation proceeds, and (3) Eder and his assignees retained the right to 
assert a claim to equitable restitution of the monies forfeited under the installment contract of December 19,1980. 
The condemnation action was tried and resulted in a takir^ by Deseret Transmission of a rightof-way over 
5.21 acres. Malnar received compensation fix the taking totalling $41,075. She expended $6,000 fix attorney fees 
in connection with the condemnation action, leaving her with $35,075. 
Eastern Utah Resources commenced die instant action fix "equitable restitution" of the down payment and 
1981 and 1982 annual installments which weie forfeited to Malnar Pericins v. Spencer, 121 
Utah 468,243 P.2d 446 (1952). Before trial, Eastern assigned its interests to plaintiflfe. A bench trial was teld at 
which the value of the 76 aaes when the defeuttaxurred was in dispute. Plairtifls presented testimony that tte 76 
aaes, including the 5.21 aaes over whi± the rightof-way was tak^ Malnar testified that 
the tract was worth $101,000 at most, not including the 5.21-aae tract, but that in any evert it was not worth more 
than $700 to $800 pa* aoe. In addition, Malnar's appraiser testified that te value of the 70 aaes (exeludirgte 
aaes conveyed at closing) in 1985, at the time the stipulation betweoi the parties was made, was $1,400 per aoe, 
totalling $98,000. Testimony was also adduced that by the date of trial the value of the tract had deoeased 
substantially due to economic decline in die Duchesne region 
The trial court found that at the time Mains* recoided die quitclaim deed to the 76 aaes, their value was 
$180,000. The court farther found that the 6 aaes conveyed at closirg were mistaken^ 
in the quitclaim deed and that Malnar had r»irtaest in that tract The court valued the 6-aoe tract at $30,000and 
subtracted that anxxir* from tte $180,000 total value to arrive at $150,000 value for the 70 aaes. Tothatamount 
it added the $35,075 net recovery in the condaimation action, for a total of $185,075. 
The trial court confuted Malnar's damages by first subtract^ the to^ $50,080.65, 
from $152,000, tte contract price, kavir^ $101,919.35. Tte court then added $10,247.80 for tte accrued interest 
due when the default occurred and $1,774.52 fa- delinquent real property taxes and water assessments, fa* a 
balance owing to Malnar undo: tte contract of $113,941.67. 
Tte court subtracted that balance, $113,941.67, from tte total amount she had received, $185,075, and 
awarded judgmertagsinst her and in fa^^ Malnar appeals. 
H. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
We first enunciate die standard of review for legal conclusions and factual findings, as both are assigned as 
error in tte instant: case. "A trial court's legal conclusions are aocorcied no particular defe we review them 
forconedress." Grayson Roper Dd. v. Finlinson, 782 P.2d 467,470 (Utah 1989). However, a trial court's 
findings of fact, whether based on oral or documentary evidence, will not be set aside on appeal unless clearly 
erroneous. M.; Utah R.Civ.P. 52(a). This "clearly erroneous" standard is applicable in equity cases such as tte 
instart case. Bourtiful v. Riley, 784 P.2d 1174,1175 (Utah 1989); Ashton v. Ashton, 733 P.2d 147,150 a 1 
(Utah 1987). 
HI. THE DISPUTED 6-ACRE TRACT 
[1] Malnar assigns as error tte court's finding that she intended to convey tte 6-acre tract of land to Elder at 
tte time of closing. This finding is reviewed undo-tte 
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ckarfy erroneous standard. On tte day of closing, December 19,1980, four separate documents were agned 
\^hkhbearipDntedi^x3sitmoftte6aaes: (1) an earnest money receipt and agreement dated December 18, 
1980, and signed either that day or the next day, providing for a sale price of $152,000 for 76 aaes; (2) the real 
estate contract dated and signed on December 19; (3) a wanaity cbed conveyi^ (4) a 
quitclaim deed executed by Eder conveying 76 acres back to Malnar in the event of Elder's default. 
The real estate contract provides in paragraph 17: 
Upon payment of the sum of $3.000 in addition to the annual payments herein required. Sella" agrees to 
release 1 acre lots. The releases will be upon approval of Bow Valley Resources of Daivo-,Cbloiado. Bayer 
shall receive credit for all sums paid for lot rek^ on the last paymerts to become due. It is not intended that 
said $3.000 per acre should be extra consideration, but merely eariy payment for early release of the lot 
(Emphasis added.) Malnar argues that this language in the cortract indicates her i r ^ ^ 
parcel only upon payment of $3,000 per acre "ova- and above the specified annual payments." 
Plaintiffs counter with language in the "earnest money receipt and offer to purchase," which provides: 
Sella" to cany balance over a five year period with 5 anmal payments, first anmal payment 1 year ftom 
closing. Interest on the balance will be 10%. Seller to release 6 acres at closing and will release 10 acre 
parcels upon paymert of $3,000.00 per acre all releases must be approved by Bow Valley of Denver 
Colorado. Released parcel will start on the northern boundary line and move in a scutheriy d i ^ ^ 
Plairtifls argue that the 6-acre parcel was deeded "fire and cfear" and that the pro 
release upon paymert of $3,000 per acre was one or more lOacre parcels separate from die 6 acres. 
The trial court heard testimony on teirtert of the parties when they s Elder 
testified that he was being given title to 6 acres for payir^$2,(XX) per acre fete 76 aaes instead of $1,500 per 
acre, flie original asking price. He paid for the 6 acres "at the tin^ of teagreem^" and testified that he "was 
given clear, fee title.M Mabiar testified that she thought the deed to the 6 acres was gping into escrow and that she 
wouki not have signed the deed had she known te Another 
witness present at the closing testified that therewasalotofconfasionatthattime. The prices on the real estate 
contract had to be amended and the warranty deed signed. Due to the confusion, the parties did not make the 
change "on the Quit-Claim Deed nor the Warranty Deed to nratch what actually happened that day." 
The trial court found: 
It was the intent of Elder and Malnar that [Elder] receive title to die said six (6) acre parcel at closing on 
December 19,1980, as is more particularfy evidenced ty the folbwirg fedeliveiy to Elder en December 
19,1980, of the warranty deed covering the six (6) acres and the recording by Elda-of said deed; the earnest 
money agreement dated December 18,1980, which provided that the said six (6) acres tract be conveyed to 
Elder; and the treatment by Elder after dosing on Decembo-19,1980, ofthesaidsix(6)aaesashissole 
property by making conveyances and assignments with respect thereto. 
In view of the intended immediate conveyance of the 6 acres, the court farther found that the failure to exclude 
die 6 acres from die legal description in die quitclaim deed to Malnar was a mistake by Elder, Malnar, and the 
drafter of the instruments. 
While Malnar disputes the finding that she intended to immediately convey the 6 acres, the into! of the parties 
is a question of fact We will not disturb the trial court's findh^ unless k is ckarfy oroneous. See Utah RQv.P. 
52(a); Sacramento Baseball Club, In:, v. Great Northern Baseball Co., 748 P.2d 1058,1059-60 (Utah 1987). 
The finding? are not "agsinst the 
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great weight of evidence," Bountiful v. Riley, 784 P.2d at 1175, and are not clearly erroneous. 
[2] We do, however, agree with Malnar that it was error for the court to quiet title to the 6 acres agsinst ha*. 
Neither plairtifls nor Malnar sought to quiettitle. Indeed, plaintifls never owned the tract and made no claim to it 
Malnar could not have sought to quiet tide in fe actm since neither EHer, D 
party. It was therefore error for die court to d ^ ^ Thatpart 
of the judgment is reversed. 
IV. VALUATION OF THE PROPERTY 
[3] Malnar corteidstiiatdE trial cou^ 
1984 when the default occurred. She first assarts that the date of valuation should be March 7,1985, because 
Elder's assignees refused to acquiesce in the forfeiture and claimed owners^ The 
trial court properly concluded as a matter of law that fair market value should be determined as of the time of 
breach, which was February 3,1984. This is the general rule in real estate contracts. See Webster v. DTTiapano, 
114 A.D.2d 698,494 N.Y.S.2d 550 (1985); Quigley v. Jones, 174 Ga.App. 787, 332 S.E.2d 7, affd, 255 Ga. 
33, 334 S.E.2d 664 (1985); Lake Share Investors v. Rite Aid Corp., 55 Md.App. 171,461 A.2d 725, affd* 298 
Md. 611,471 A.2d 735 (1983); American Mechankal Corp. v. Union Mach. Co. of Lynn, Inc., 21 Mass.App. 
97,485 N.E.2d 680 (1985). As the trial judge stated from die bench, Mahiar's assertion appears to be a claim for 
irieifaence with n^iketable tide, \^iich wouki have to be aflBm^tively pleaded. No such pleading was made, and 
the trial judge correcdy confined his valuatkxitothetimeofdefkikwlra 
property. In addition, Malnar testified that between the tinre of retaldr^ the property an^ 
removing the cloud on the tide, she made no attempt to resell the property or to list it with a real estate broker. 
Thus Malnar was not prevented from seflir^ tic property by arty action of Ekler or ta 
[4] Malnar farther asserts that the trial court's fectual findirg valuirg the propeity An 
expat witness for plaintifls testified that the land was watfi $180,000. Maker's appraiser affixed a lesser value to 
the land in 1985 but was unable to give an opnkxi on the \^lue of die property in 1984. The valuation finding is 
therefore not dearly erroneous. 
V. CONDEMNATION PROCEEDS 
[5] Malnar next contends tiiat die trial court erred in charging her widi die $35,075 net condemnation award as 
ifkhadbeenpaklbytiiebuyerasprinc^ When die condemnation action was filed, Eider held 
equitable tide to die land. That tife After forfeiture 
and before the award, Elder and his assignees stipulated that any proceeds should go to Malnar. Malnar argues 
that where forfeiture occurs before a condemnation award is made, die vendor takes die land bade burdened by die 
condemnation and is therefore entitled to die proceeds since they are in payment of damages to die lands he 
repossesses. We agree. 
The trial judge found diat "on October 18,1982, an order of immediate occupancy was entered and a required 
cash deposit paid into the court by [condemnor] for tte landowner." UtahCodeArai Sec. 78-34-9 provides in 
pertinent part 
The rights of the just compensation for the land so taken or damaged shaH vest in tte parties e n t i ^ 
and the said judgment shall include ... interest... fiom the date of taking actual possession thereof by the 
plaintiff or order of occupancy, whichever is earlier.... 
(Emphasis added.) 
The court's authority in protecting the vested interests of both parties v ^ explained m v. Third 
Judicial District Court, 29 Utah 2d 472,475-76,511 P.2d 739,742 (1973). Tte condemn* 
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deposits money in court. Ujpon proper application, tte court orders ^ However, the 
vendee is normally entitled to the condemnation award as he is the equitable owner. The court can therefore make 
orders with respett to encunrtxanxsa^ Justice, equity, and 
practicality are considered by the court in protectir^tiieintaests of the parties. 
In the instant case, however, before any disbursements w o e ordered firm te fimds d 
condemnor, defeult occurred. Both equitable and kgsl title vested in Malnar, with tte concomitant r i ^ 
the eminent domain proceeds. It was a practical solution for the parties to stipulate that tte proceeds would go to 
Malnar. The proceeds stood in lieu of the rightof-way taken. The defaulting vendee is this credited with 
returning the condemned land undamaged. It follows that the proceeds are not also paymats toward the contract 
price; to so reg3rd them would be double-counting. 
VI. CALCULATION OF DAMAGES 
[6\ Malnar contends that the trial court ened in departirg from tte method of c a l ^ ^ 
in Rakinsv.Spenaa:, 121 Utah 468,478-79,243 P.2d 446,451-52 (1952) (this method is set out betow). We 
have previously held that the factors used in tte Peridns test need not terigidfy adhered to: 
Although these are reasonable factors to detemiine damages, they were not mea^ 
teappMmectoricafly in every case. In detemiining equitable damages, the trial court may use whatever 
factors it finds most appropriate to achieve justice. 
Johnson v. Caiman, 572 P.2d 371, 374 (Utah 1977). However, in reviewing the method used by the trial 
judge to arrive at a judgment for plaintiffs of $71,183.14, we are left with "a definite and firm conviction that a 
mistake has been made." State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191,193 (Utah 1987). 
The trial judge in effect returned to the defkiltii^ vendee tte appreciate This was 
error. We stated in Butler v. Wilkinson, 740 P.2dl244,1256 (Utah 1987), that a vendee "is entitled to the 
appreciated value of the property o v a the contract purchase pice as long as his or ho- interest has not been 
forfeited." (Emphasis added.) However, when the vendee defkilts on property whi± 
he is not entitled to the appreciated value. The appreciated value, however, negsles the vendor's entitlement to 
damages for "loss of advantageous barg3in," tte first factor in tte Pedcins test See Harris v. Shell Dev. Corp. 
Nev., Im., 95 Nev. 348, 5 ^ P.2d 731,734 (1979) ('Where ... tte market value of tte lanl at tte time of breach 
is higher than tte purchase price, the vendor is entitled to only nominal damages plus proved consequential 
damages."); Zareas v. Smith, 404 A.2d 599,60OO1 (N.H.1979) Of tte value at the time of breach is greater than 
te contract price, the v e i ^ can recover onfy nominal da^ accord Spurgeon v. 
Drumtelkr, 174 Cal.App.3d 659,665,220 CaLRptr. 195,198 (CtApp.1985); IslariKkntry Join Venture v. 
State, 57 Haw. 259,554 P.2d 761,767 (1976); see also Soflfe v. Ridd, 659 P.2d 1082,1085 (Utah 1983) 
(defaulting purchaser testified that when he vacated the property, ft Vas worth a s ^ 
contract price"; thereto, vendor 
We recalculate the damages using the Perkins formula, which takes into consideration the following elements: 
(1) Loss of an advantageous bargain; 
(2) Any damage to or depredation of the property; 
(3) Any decline in value due to change in market value of the property not allowed in items Nos. 1 and 2; 
(4) For the fair rental value during the period of occupancy. 
ftridns v. Sperra, 121 Utahat47&-79,243 P.2d at 451-52; Cole v. Rater, 5 Utah 2d 263,267,300P.2d 
623,627 (1956). 
U\ Loss of advantageous bargain: The contract price of theproperty was 
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$152,000. The value of the property, including the disputed 6 aora, at foifeta Malnarisnot 
entitled to loss of bargjrin damages when the property has appreciated m v ^ Soflfe v. Ridd, 659 P.2d at 1085. 
f81 Damage to or depredation of the property: The $6,000 attorney fees expended in the eminert domain 
action are not damages. Malnarwouki have been required to pay them in the absent of te contract with Elder. 
Taxes and water assessments are owed in the amount of $1,774.52. 
[9][10]The nonreturn of the 6-acre tract constitutes an item of damage. Inasmuch as the trial court found that 
Malnar intended to convey that tract at dosing and we have affirmed that finding, her damages are $12,000, 
representing six times the: contract price of $2,000 per acre, net the value of the t r ^ 
($30,000). 
Decline in value due to change in market value not allowed above: None. 
1111 Fair rental value during the period of occupancy: The trial cant property altowedMato 
contract as an alternative to fair ratal value. Seejiillmer v. Blood, 546 P.2d 606 (Utah 1976). The total amourt 
paid was $26,109.71. Anotter $10,247.80 accrued to the date of forfeiture. 
In summary, damages suffered by Malnar are as follows: 
$1,774.52 delinquent taxes and water assessments 
12,000.00 value of 6 acres conveyed 
26,109.71 interest paid on contract 
10,247.80 aocrued interest owing 
$50,132.03 
Mataar received the down payment on the cortract of $23,500 and the 1981 and 1982 a ^ ^ 
each, making a total of $76,190.36. 
[12] [13] The contract provides that thirty days afler the default of the buyer and his failure to remedy the same within five 
days after written notice, the sella- may "be released from all oblig3tions in law and in equity to convey said property, and all 
payments which have been made theretofore on this contract ty fe Buyer, shall be forfeited to the Sella- as liquidated 
damages for the nonperformance of the contact..." ff this forfeits clause is 
including the excess of payment made ova" damages, which is $26,058.33, approximately 17 percent of the contract price of 
$152,000. We will enforce a forfeiture clause unless we find that the forfeiture would be so "grossly excessive in relation to 
any realistic view of loss that might have been contemplated by the parties that it would so shock the conscience thai a court of 
equity would refiise such forfeiture." Jensen v. Nielsen, 26 Utah 2d 96,97,485 P.2d 673,674 (1971); accord Strand v. 
Mayne, 14 Utah 2d 355, 384 P.2d 396 (1963); Jaoobson v. Swan, 3 Utah 2d 59,278 P.2d 294 (1954). Examination of our 
case law indicates that this court will enforce the forfeiture clause when the amount of forfeiture does not greatly exceed, or is 
less than, the amount of damages. In Cole v. Raker, 5 Utah 2d at 264, 300 P.2d at 624, the vendee had paid $11,600 
toward a contract price of $40,000. However, the difference between the purdiase price and the value of te property at te 
time of default exceeded $11,600, and this closed further inquiry. A similar result was reached in Weyher v. Peterson, 16 
Utah 2d 278, 399 P.2d 438 (1965). In Carlson v. Hamilton, 8 Utah 2d 272, 332 P.2d 989 (1958), the vendee paid $6,680 
principal and interest toward a $22,000 contract price. The excess of payment over damages, which inchKied rental value, 
was $2,119.94. The amount "was but 91 /2 pacent of the purchase price, an amount that would exceed but little the real 
estate commissiQn that would have to be paid on resale of the property...." 8 Utah 2d at 274, 332 P.2d at 990. InStrandv. 
Mayne, 14 Utah 2d at 356-57, 384 P.2d at 396, the vendees forfeited atax)st half the ccxtoct price becau« 
and ratal value exceeded what they had paid. Similarly, the vendee in IMmer v. Blocxi, 546 P.2d at 609-10, fo 
$12,150 paid to the vendor, but this amourt 
of occupancy. 
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In these cases, and in the cases cited in Pakinsv. Sparer, 
[i]t will be observed that in all cases where the stipulation for liquidated damages was enforced it bore some reasonable 
relation to the actual damages which could reasonably be anticipate 
forfeiture which would allow an unconscionable and exhorbitait recovery. 
Pfeddns v. Spencer, 121 Utah at 474,243 P.2d at 449. In tte instant case, a recovery of over $26,000 in excess of 
actual damages shows that liquidated danrages bear no reasonabk relation^ A forfeiture here would 
alfow an unxnscionable recovery. We therefore award plaintiffs the $26,058.33 that was paid in excess of Malnar's 
damages. SrePferkins, 121 Utah at 478-79,243 P.2d at 451-52. 
[14] Plaintiffs cross-appeal from the trial rourt's denial of prqudgm^ A survey of our cases where 
prejudgment interest was awarded indicates that interest has been allowed in actions for damage to personal property, Fell v. 
Union R*c. Ry., 32 Utah 101, 88 P. 1003 (1907); Uinta Pipeline Corp. v. White Superior Co., 546 P.2d 885 (Utah 1976); 
inactions brought ona written cortract, JackB. P&rson Constr. Co. v. State, 552P.2d 107 (Utah 1976); Bjorkv. April 
Indus., Inc., 560 P.2d 315 (Utah 1977); Jorgensai v. John Clay and Co., 660 P.2d 229 (Utah 1983); Anderson v. State 
FarmCas. &FireCo., 583P.2d 101 (Utah 1978); and in an action to recover a liquidated overpayment of water 
subsca^tm charges, Stakerv. Huntington Cleveland Lr. Co., 664P.2d 1188 (Utah 1983). Inmany of these cases, we 
stressed that the loss had been fixed as of a definte 
accuracy in accordance with well-established mks of damages. No case has been d e d to us where we have alfowed 
prejudgment interest in an action such as the instart case, which is for equit^^ "A suit of this nature involving the 
invocation of a forfeiture and/or the errforcement of a purchase contract invokes consideration of the principles of equity which 
address themselves to the conscience and discretion of the trial court" Fullmer v. Blood, 546 P.2d at 610. In view of the 
highly equitable nature of this action where the court has discretion m d e t e ^ ^ if any, to be returned to the 
defaulting vendee, we find no error in the denial of prejudgment interest 
Remanded for the purpose of amendk^ Costs awarded to defendant 
HALL, C.J., and STEWART, DURHAM and ZIMMERMAN, JJ., ccmir. 
